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I. Executive Summar y 
 
The New Hampshire Insurance Department (NHID) contracted with Compass Health Analytics 
(Compass) and its partner, the Center for Health Law and Economics at the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School (UMass), to provide recommendations for health care provider 
payment reform.1 In recent years, provider payment reform has shown some promise in its 
ability to contain health care costs while maintaining access and quality.  NHID expressed 
interest in addressing New Hampshire’s high health care spending while protecting health care 
access and quality through reforms to policies affecting provider payment.  
 
New Hampshire health care spending is high and rising.  Data from the Kaiser Family 
Foundation illuminate the issues facing the New Hampshire health insurance market.2 Over the 
period 1991-2009, New Hampshire’s growth rate in per capita health spending was 4th in the 
country at 6.6% per annum, compared to 5.3% nationally.  That sustained growth rate caused 
New Hampshire to move from 32nd in the nation in 1991 to 9th in the nation in 2009 at $7,839 per 
person per year.  New Hampshire’s government-financed health insurance spending per person 
has been below average over the same time period, indicating that cost growth is being driven in 
the commercial market.  
In the New Hampshire commercial fully-insured market, over the period 2010-2013, health 
insurance premiums increases have been at a modest 2%-3% per year.  However, total cost 
growth over this period has averaged in the 4%-6% range annually, driven by similarly-sized 
provider price increases.  Premium increases have not kept up because utilization of services has 
been decreasing at about 2 ½% per year, and because costs are being shifted from premiums and 
onto individuals through much higher out-of-pocket costs, namely higher deductibles and other 
cost sharing.3   
 
Much activity related to payment and system delivery reform has been occurring in New 
Hampshire, with the formation of a number of accountable care organizations (ACOs), for both 
Medicare and commercially insured populations.    Compass and UMass have reviewed 
previously collected information about payment reform activities and market information in New 
Hampshire, and have formulated recommendations intended to encourage and support continued 
movement toward value-based payment.  Specifically, we developed three comprehensive 
longer-term recommendations, four targeted short-term recommendations, and two stand-alone 
actions.  We address the comprehensive recommendations first, followed by the targeted 
recommendations.  
 
                                                 
1 This report reflects the recommendations of the authors and may not reflect the views of and is not an endorsement 
by the New Hampshire Insurance Department. 
2 Kaiser Family Foundation, “State Health Facts,” http://kff.org/statedata (accessed September 24, 2014). Statistics 
cited are from KFF unless otherwise noted. 
3 See New Hampshire Insurance Department cost driver reports for 2010-2013, discussed in more detail in section II 
of this report. 




We evaluated a wide range of payment reform initiatives for their potential to work in New 
Hampshire.  These options ranged from large state-run initiatives to reforms encouraging 
promising contractual relationships between providers and payers.  A full list of options we 
considered is available in Appendix A of this report.   
 
This study assumes that the goal of reform is to encourage better value for consumers by 
reducing the rate of cost growth while maintaining or improving quality and access.  
 
In order to narrow our options, we defined four conditions we feel are necessary to successfully 
implement payment reform.  First, incentives are a fundamental basis of payment reform and a 
system that rewards providers and health plans for providing high quality, cost-effective care.  
Second, consensus from key stakeholders, including providers, payers, employers, consumers, 
and state agencies, will help move a viable plan forward.  Third, collaboration will align reform 
across payers and identify areas where shared infrastructure can be effective.  Finally, 
consequences for inaction are imperative for the success of any reform effort.   
 
We applied a set of criteria to analyze the initial “wide net” of options to determine which 
approaches to include in our recommendations to NHID. Criteria included political feasibility, 
cost containment, quality of care, access to care, provider solvency, state government costs, legal 
hurdles, and alignment with other programs.  A full list of criteria is detailed in Section III.B of 




We recommend three comprehensive approaches to support payment reform, four short-
term steps the state could take to move toward payment reform, and two stand-alone actions to 
address high health care spending in New Hampshire.  The strategies are not mutually exclusive, 
nor are they dependent upon each other.  The state may choose to pursue any combination of 




Payment Reform Strategy 1: Publicly Report Progress Against Benchmarks 
 
Under this option, New Hampshire would set health care cost and quality benchmarks statewide, 
devise a system to publicly identify entities failing to meet the benchmarks, and develop 
incentives to keep costs below and quality above these benchmarks.  
 
New Hampshire could designate a state agency or commission to set the health care cost and 
quality benchmarks.  The cost benchmark could be a target growth rate for total medical 
expenditures, and could be tied to an economic indicator, such as the growth in state domestic 
product, the Consumer Price Index, or the growth in national health expenditures.  The state 
would measure progress for payers and providers.   
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New Hampshire should consider monitoring health care cost and quality trends at the state level, 
as well as for each large provider and payer.  We recommend that New Hampshire publicize the 
names of providers and payers that exceed the cost growth benchmark or fail to meet quality 
benchmarks.  New Hampshire could consider adding additional consequences, such as fines for 
providers and payers, if cost trends do not moderate.   
 
Payment Reform Strategy 2: Promote Alternative Payment Methods 
 
Under this option, New Hampshire would encourage health care participants to move toward the 
use of alternative payment methods and ACOs and other integrated care models. We recommend 
that New Hampshire develop a model contract which contains new payment mechanisms (Model 
Contract), detailed in this report, for use across payers in their contracts with providers.  We also 
recommend that New Hampshire convene a stakeholder commission charged with evaluating 
and adopting the Model Contract or proposing a similar alternative, educate stakeholders 
regarding the use of such types of contracts, and consider regulating provider rates if 
stakeholders fail to align on a new contract and payment model.  
 
The Model Contract could set forth provisions relating to a global or shared savings 
methodology, care coordination requirements, quality measures, monitoring for compliance, and 
grievance and appeals processes.  In order to work with stakeholders in this process, we 
recommend establishing a multi-stakeholder commission to evaluate the Model Contract and 
either recommend its adoption or suggest a “stakeholder alternative.”   
 
Once the Model Contract or approved stakeholder alternative are published, we recommend that 
New Hampshire engage in stakeholder education – especially of payers and providers – to 
encourage participation.  The educational program could address concerns about entering into 
alternative payment contracts, describe models of care that have worked in other states, and offer 
technical assistance on the “nuts and bolts” of entering into alternative contracts. This technical 
support is consistent with the State Innovation Model (SIM) grant application submitted by the 
New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, and we recommend that New 
Hampshire coordinate across agencies to offer a clear path for organizations entering into these 
arrangements.   
 
We recommend that New Hampshire sets forth clear consequences if providers and payers do not 
pursue alternative payment arrangements.  If New Hampshire does not achieve health care cost 
containment, the state may need to turn to more prescriptive approaches to address the issue.   
 
Some providers may be concerned about the financial and related implications of entering into 
risk arrangements with payers.  To address these concerns, we recommend that New Hampshire 
develop a structure for regulating provider risk, similar in some respects to the one used to 
regulate risk held by insurance carriers, in order to ensure provider solvency as providers take on 
more risk.  
 
Some providers may be concerned about implications in federal and state antitrust law if they 
take market actions to fit into the alternative payment model.  We recommend that New 
Hampshire coordinate across agencies to address these issues.  We also recommend that New 
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Hampshire consider implementing state action immunity doctrine to protect providers from 
federal antitrust laws in certain limited circumstances.   
 
Payment Reform Strategy 3: Strengthen Employer Purchasing Power 
 
The third long-term approach would address the relative weakness in purchasing power of 
employers buying health insurance for their employees.  New Hampshire’s health care market is 
characterized by highly concentrated provider markets, a concentrated insurance market with a 
dominant player, and a relatively disaggregated and disorganized employer purchaser market. In 
this market structure, it can be difficult to exert competitive pressure on providers, and relatively 
easy for insurers to mark up the cost of care and pass the bill along to employers. Furthermore, 
solutions for the lack of competitiveness in provider and insurer markets are not obvious. This 
context makes exploration of ideas to strengthen the employer purchasing market worthwhile. 
 
We recommend that the state analyze options for strengthening the purchasing power of 
employers.  These options can include taking additional steps to increase transparency (discussed 
under short-term steps below).  We also recommend that policy makers consider a mechanism 
that allows increased coordination and efficiency on the part of purchasers, as the state monitors 
market conditions in the small group sector going forward.  Any analysis of this type will need to 
consider issues related to the Affordable Care Act (ACA), anti-trust, and New Hampshire 
insurance laws and regulations.  Success in strengthening purchasers role in the market will 
complement and support other strategies aimed at controlling cost growth, and may be a 




We also identified a number of steps New Hampshire could take in the short-term to begin to lay 
the groundwork for longer term payment reform.  We recommend that New Hampshire take 
these steps, in any order, regardless of which comprehensive payment reform strategies it 
chooses to pursue.  
 
Step 1:  Continue to Expand Data Transparency    
 
We recommend that New Hampshire build on NHID’s existing price transparency initiatives by 
continuing to innovate in publishing information on relative efficiency, quality, and access.  
Total health care spending, carrier premiums, provider prices, and quality measures should be 
publicly reported through a consumer-friendly website.  The state should expand 
communications to drive consumers to the site, for example, by reaching out to local Chambers 
of Commerce and consumer groups.   
 
Step 2:  Leverage Available Resources   
 
The State of New Hampshire obtained a SIM design award in the first round of SIM funding, and 
has applied for additional design funds in round two, for which announcement of awards should 
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occur by the time this report is published.4 The amount requested for the Round 2 funds is $2 
million for additional design, which includes the design of regional technical cooperatives to 
help providers develop the infrastructure to operate and manage innovative payment models. 
Also made available by Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) have been much 
larger “model test grants” which are focused on implementation and testing of model designs. 
Among the potential uses of these resources would be to fund staffing of the Commissions 
recommended in this report, funding the development of the expanded data transparency 
initiatives described below, as well as expanding the ACO technical support and infrastructure 
requests contained in the most recent SIM application request. 
 
Step 3:  Establish a Commission 
 
We recommend that New Hampshire form a commission to choose a payment reform path, draft 
recommended legislation, and help implement reforms.  The commission could include 
stakeholders from the health care system and representatives of government agencies.  The 
commission should address health care cost containment, health care quality, and health care 
access.  
 
Step 4:  Expand Consumer Protection 
  
We recommend that New Hampshire plan for consumer protection for any approach it takes 
transitioning to new models of care and payment. Introducing new provider payment 
mechanisms on a broad scale has the potential to have a negative impact on consumers. Tools for 
consideration by the state include use of quality measurement, grievance and appeals processes; 
utilization monitoring; stratifying quality measures for minority populations; providing 
ombudsman programs; facilitating patient advisory councils; and conducting audits.   
 
  Stand-alone Actions 
 
We identified two additional actions New Hampshire could take to contain certain costs without 
pursuing comprehensive payment reform.  New Hampshire could pursue either of these actions 
independently of our other recommendations. 
 
Stand-Alone Action 1:  Reform Certificate of Need 
   
We recommend that New Hampshire revise the CON process to expedite the process for projects 
that further goals of payment and delivery reform, and shorten time frames overall for CON 




                                                 
4 For the Round 2 application, see New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, “State Innovation 
Model (SIM) Model Design Application,” July 21, 2014, http://www.dhhs.nh.gov/ocom/documents/sim-round2-
app-sub.pdf (accessed October 8, 2014).  
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Stand-Alone Action 2:  Reform Nonprofit Requirements 
   
We recommend that New Hampshire leverage its oversight mechanisms for nonprofit institutions 
to address different aspects of health care prices.  New Hampshire could use the community 
benefits requirement to encourage a more aggressive approach to population health.  The level of 




New Hampshire health care costs are high and rising.  Current initiatives to develop value-based 
payment mechanisms are promising but we believe they need additional support and 
encouragement to reach their potential.  By engaging in reforms supportive to the health care 
system, New Hampshire has the opportunity to encourage health care cost containment while 
maintaining access to quality health care.   
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II. Introduction  
 
The NHID contracted with Compass Health Analytics and its partner, the Center for Health Law 
and Economics at the University of Massachusetts Medical School (UMass), to provide 
recommendations for health care provider payment reform.5 This report suggests approaches to 
improve health care cost and quality in New Hampshire through reform of provider payment and 
related policies that support payment reform.   
 
A. Problem to be Solved  
 
New Hampshire health care spending is high and rising. Data from the Kaiser Family Foundation 
illuminate the issues facing the New Hampshire health insurance market.6 Over the period 1991-
2009, New Hampshire’s growth rate in per capita health spending was 4th in the country at 6.6% 
per annum, compared to 5.3% nationally. That sustained growth rate caused New Hampshire to 
move from 32nd in the nation in 1991 to 9th in the nation in 2009 at $7,839 per person per year.  
While these overall per capita numbers were increasing at a rate well above average relative to 
other states, spending in New Hampshire on government health insurance programs was growing 
at a slower than average rate. Between 1991 and 2009 Medicaid spending grew at a rate 39th in 
the country, while both per enrollee and total Medicare spending in New Hampshire grew at 
about the national average. Because New Hampshire has the lowest percentage of residents 
covered by Medicaid of any state, the spending growth in Medicare and Medicaid combined is 
only slightly below average. 
Given below-average spending growth on government programs, the higher-than-average growth 
in overall spending must be caused by growth in the commercial insurance and uninsured 
sectors, which are not subject to government pricing for provider services. Between 2010 and 
2012 in New Hampshire, provider prices in the commercial health insurance sector grew 
approximately 6% per year,7 while utilization declined approximately 2 ½ percent per year,8 
resulting in a 3% annual increase in total spending.9  In 2013, preliminary data indicated that 
provider price increases moderated to a rate of 4%,10 while utilization continued downward at -
2.5%,11 with total medical spending per year moderating to 1%.12 
                                                 
5 This report reflects the recommendations of the authors and may not reflect the views of and is not an endorsement 
by the New Hampshire Insurance Department. 
6 Kaiser Family Foundation, “State Health Facts,” http://kff.org/statedata (accessed September 24, 2014). Statistics 
cited are from KFF unless otherwise noted. 
7New Hampshire Insurance Department, “2012 Medical Cost Drivers,” December, 2013, 22.  
8Ibid., p. 22. 
9 Ibid., p. 20. 
10 New Hampshire Insurance Department, “Preliminary Report on 2013 Medical Cost Drivers,” October, 2013, 21. 
11 Ibid., p. 20. 
12 Ibid., p. 19. 
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Provider prices in the commercial and uninsured segments are clearly an important issue in New 
Hampshire health care cost growth, as these segments constitute a very large part of the market. 
Approximately two thirds of New Hampshire residents are covered by private health insurance, 
with about 55% of these in self-funded employer plans and 38% in small and large-group insured 
plans. New Hampshire has the highest percentage of non-elderly residents covered by employer-
based insurance in the nation. In 2012, its single person employer-based premium was $5,688, 
11th in the country. In the recent 2010-2012 period, New Hampshire’s premium rate of growth 
for fully-insured products has averaged less than 2%, but large increases in out-of-pocket 
exposure in policies sold has masked a large increase of health spending in this population.13 
Premium levels would have grown by an additional 4%-6%, to a total of 6%-8% annually, if 
benefit levels, including cost sharing, had stayed constant.14  In preliminary 2013 data, this 
pattern continued at a slightly moderated pace.  Premiums increased by approximately 3%, but 
would have increased an additional 2-4% if consumer exposure to out-of-pocket expenses hadn’t 
continued to increase significantly.15  
From these data describing trends in New Hampshire, it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
health care costs are growing rapidly in the state largely because of provider price increases, and 
that these increases are masked in premium data because an increasingly heavy portion of costs 
are being borne out of pocket by commercial insured members. On an annual basis in 2012, the 
out-of-pocket burden for single person coverage was $1,001 per member,16 on top of what is 
already the 7th highest employee contribution for health insurance premiums nationally in 2012 
at $1,260 annually. 
The provider market in New Hampshire is highly concentrated, with little hospital competition in 
most of the state, and many physician practices owned by hospitals. Despite concentration in the 
insurance market as well (Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield is the dominant insurer, with 63% of 
the fully-insured market17), carriers have had very limited success in controlling growth in 
provider prices. While it may be that insurer concentration has moderated even higher provider 
price growth, constituents in New Hampshire are unanimous in their belief that healthcare costs 
are too high and growing too rapidly.18 In economic theory, when a dominant insurer faces a 
dominant provider (as is the case in most of New Hampshire), the test of whether the insurer is 
using its buying power (i) to break the provider dominance, or (ii) to enrich itself, is whether 
consumers receive more services at lower prices or fewer services at higher prices.19 As noted 
above, the commercial utilization trend has been negative in recent years, supporting the notion 
that dominant insurers are focused on maximizing their profit margins rather than using their 
market power to help consumers. 
                                                 
13 NHID 2012 Cost Drivers Report, op. cit., p. 12. 14 Ibid., p. 15. 
14 Ibid., p. 15. 
15 NHID Preliminary Report on 2013 Cost Drivers, op. cit. 
16 Ibid., p. 20. 
17 Ibid., p. 12. 
18 University of Massachusetts Medical School and Freedman Healthcare, “New Hampshire’s Health Insurance 
Market and Provider Payment System: An Analysis of Stakeholder Views,” June 2013, 1.  
19 Mark V. Pauly, “Managed Care, Market Power, and Monopsony,” Health Services Research 33, no. 5 Pt. 2 (Dec 
1998). 
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Added to this dynamic is the relative weakness of New Hampshire employer purchasing power. 
New Hampshire is 36th in the country compared to other states in the percentage of its employed 
persons in firms larger than 20 employees.20 As a state with relatively low concentration in its 
business sector, employers as a purchasing force are relatively weak and the data suggest that 
they do not exert sufficient pressure on providers through carriers to counteract their market 
power. 
In the face of this history of cost growth, both the public and private sectors are taking steps 
intended to “bend the cost curve.”  Like many other states, the State of New Hampshire is 
examining effects of provider payment systems on the costs of health care, in particular the effect 
of the dominant fee-for-service model and the closed process for negotiating contracts for 
provider reimbursement rates. This system might confer a competitive advantage on carriers with 
established networks and provider relationships, potentially creating barriers to the entry of new 
carriers. In addition, select providers with well-established reputations with consumers and 
employers and limited geographic competition may gain market leverage sufficient to drive up 
provider rates for all carriers.  The New Hampshire HealthCost website has been a path-breaking 
initiative aimed at allowing better transparency surrounding provider prices. 
 
New Hampshire has also been actively pursuing a number of 1115 waiver applications, for 
Medicaid expansion21 as well as system delivery transformation. 22 These waiver requests could 
be expanded – or a new request submitted—to include some of the payment reform initiatives 
recommended in this report for the Medicaid population, increasing the effectiveness and breadth 
of any reform it undertakes.  In addition, the State has also received one SIM grant from CMS 
and has applied for a second.  The pending second proposal includes funding for developing 
payment reform infrastructure support to be provided on a regional basis in New Hampshire. 
 
In the private sector, providers in New Hampshire have also been very active in advancing 
patient-centered care through primary care medical homes, and participation in ACOs for both 
Medicare and private payers.  Providers are participating in the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program, Medicare Pioneer ACO, Advanced Payment ACO Model, and commercial ACO 
initiatives. These initiatives, though important, do not yet encompass a large percentage of the 
care delivered in New Hampshire. Only 11% of insured members were in upside/downside risk 
arrangements in 2012,23 although it is likely this percentage has increased in the past two years.  
 
With all these government and state initiatives underway, New Hampshire remains in the top 10 
states in health care spending per capita.24  This report explores additional ways that the State 
                                                 
20 United States Census Bureau, “Statistics of U.S. Businesses: 2008: All industries United States - by Employment 
Size of Enterprise,” http://www.census.gov/epcd/susb/2008/us/US--.HTM#table2 (accessed September 24, 2014). 
21 See http://www.dhhs.nh.gov/pap-1115-waiver/index.htm 
22 New Hampshire has submitted an 1115 waiver application, entitled “Building Capacity for Transformation,” in 
May, 2014, as amended by an addendum submitted in June, 2014. References to “Medicaid waiver” in this memo 
refer to an 1115 waiver, the most common waiver utilized by states to implement Medicaid health system and 
payment reform initiatives.  The Transformation waiver request could be amended to include changes needed to 
implement the recommendations in this report, or a new 1115 waiver request could be submitted, depending on the 
approval status of the current waiver request with CMS.  
23 New Hampshire Insurance Department, “2012 Medical Cost Drivers,” December, 2013, 46. 
24 Kaiser Family Foundation, “State Health Facts,” http://kff.org/statedata  
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can support and encourage continued movement in the direction of effective payment reform that 
moderates cost growth while retaining quality and access for consumers.  
 
B. Discussion of Key Goa ls (Cost Conta inment Over  Time, Access, Qua lity) 
 
The primary goal of payment reform is to moderate growth in healthcare costs while maintaining 
or improving quality, access, and provider solvency.  Depending how it is done, maintaining or 
improving quality, access, or solvency could make cost moderation more difficult, though some 
assert that the absolute level of healthcare spending can be reduced by 20% or more while 
enhancing quality.25   
 
Economists distinguish between actions that create cost reductions that are one-time events, and 
those (harder to accomplish) that reduce the rate of growth over time.  The former are “removing 
a layer of fat” from the level of costs, while the latter require some fundamental alteration of the 
factors that drive cost growth over time. With respect to reducing the rate of growth over time, 
many economists also question whether people are willing to give up the improvements in 
healthcare technology, and related actual and perceived beneficial life expectancy and quality of 
life gains that are a key component of ongoing spending growth.  At the same time, there is 
recognition that a change in the financing model will be necessary to balance these advances 
against the increasingly large share of national income consumed by healthcare.26  
 
Any change in financing and payment models should allow providers to adjust in ways that do 
not harm the provider system or quality of care, nor impede access to care by consumers, and 
should be carefully designed to avoid other unintended consequences.  Payment models that have 
a budget or target spending level have inherent incentives to reduce spending, and these methods 
should be paired with carefully structured, executed, and monitored measurement systems for 
access and quality to help ensure that the outcome of the new methods are truly “value-based” 
and not just cost reducing. 
 
More generally, the system is complex, and changes to it should be based on a thorough 
understanding of the environment in New Hampshire and of the interactions between employers, 
consumers, government, carriers, and providers.  
 
In considering whether payment reform is a policy tool that has the potential to succeed in 
achieving the goals of controlling cost without impacting quality negatively, it is useful to touch 
on some history of Medicare payment systems and previous reforms implemented.  The original 
method Medicare used to pay hospitals was cost-based reimbursement.  This method led to rapid 
cost growth.  In the 1980s, Medicare replaced cost-based reimbursement with the Prospective 
Payment System (PPS), which compensates hospitals based on prospectively determined case-
rates that vary based on the diagnosis of the patient and other clinical and demographic 
                                                 
25 Donald M. Berwick and Andrew D. Hackbarth, “Eliminating Waste in U.S. Health Care,” Journal of the 
American Medical Association 307, no. 14 (April 11, 2012).  
26 Michael E. Chernew and Joseph P. Newhouse, "Health care spending growth," in Handbook of Health Economics 
2 (2012), 1-43. 
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information.  The impact of the inpatient PPS was a reduction in utilization, length of stay, and 
slower cost growth, without reducing quality of care.27  Similar results were obtained with the 
implementation of prospective payment for home health.28   
 
In general, response to prospective case rates followed the path predicted by economic theory, in 
that costs per case were reduced, but incidence of cases often stayed constant or increased, or 
shifted to other settings with less restrictive payment.  Because prospective payment systems 
retained an inherent incentive to provide more cases, their ability to contain costs, while an 
improvement over cost-based reimbursement, was limited.  Medicare in the early 1990s also 
implemented the Resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS) for physician services.  The 
RBRVS payment method itself is not case-based, and does nothing to control volume.  Congress 
did include a feature to control volume in its physician payment reform, creating a “sustainable 
growth rate” (SGR) formula that was intended to decrease fee levels if physician service cost 
growth exceeded a pre-defined rate of growth.  However, for political reasons Congress has 
never allowed this fee reduction to take place, every year going through a wearily familiar 
pattern of cancelling the now-very-large cumulative payment cut at the 11th hour.  While one can 
debate whether the SGR was a reasonably designed mechanism for cost control, we can say with 
certainty that it has never actually been tested, and that it has failed the political feasibility test. 
 
In recent years, CMS has implemented a number of initiatives related to budget-target-based 
ACO payment systems.  The Medicare Shared Savings program, Pioneer ACO program, and 
Advanced Payment ACO program are all intended to address the two primary “leaks” in 
previous payment reforms – by creating a fixed budget for all services, the incentives for 
increasing cases delivered and shifting care to alternative sites of service have been reversed.  
The early evidence on these programs shows results that are mixed, with positive signs that the 
approach can be very successful.29  Approximately a third of Pioneer ACO programs have 
dropped out after having difficulty meeting the cost benchmarks. However, in the second year, 
11 of 20 programs earned savings bonuses, and quality measures have improved significantly.   
 
Similarly, the Medicare Shared Savings program in its first year had 53 ACOs generating 
savings payments and significant increases in quality scores.  At this point, a careful assessment 
of how to evaluate how much cost reduction has occurred on net remains to be done.  The 
organizational changes and infrastructure necessary to manage global payment approaches at the 
provider level are significant, and it may be more useful to ask if it can work when done well.  
For example, two Pioneer ACO programs reduced spending relative to the target by an average 
of 6% in each of the first two years.   Learning more about which techniques organizations have 
used to generate savings, and how much saving is a result of careful execution of required 
activities and how much is an artifact of the payment methodology are important questions to 
                                                 
27 Davis, Carolyne K., and Deborah J. Rhodes. "The impact of DRGs on the cost and quality of health care in the 
United States." Health Policy 9.2 (1988): 117-131. 
28 Huckfeldt, Peter J., et al. "Effects of Medicare payment reform: evidence from the home health interim and 
prospective payment systems." Journal of health economics 34 (2014): 1-18. 
29 United States Department of Health and Human Services, “Fact Sheets:  Medicare ACOs continue to succeed in 
improving care, lowering cost growth,” September 16, 2014, 
http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2014-Fact-sheets-items/2014-09-16.html 
(accessed October 23, 2014) 
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monitor going forward.  The clear incentive superiority of this approach and the significant 
success achieved by some ACOs is promising. 
C. Findings from Pr ior  Work  
 
Designing effective health care reform requires an understanding of the current environment, 
experience with potential reform tools, and knowledge of stakeholder views.  NHID laid the 
groundwork for analyzing available provider payment reform options with previous projects 
summarized below.  These projects assessed hospital prices, stakeholder viewpoints, and legal 
considerations.  
 
1.  UMass findings on price variation in New Hampshire hospitals: In 2012, UMass 
conducted an analysis of price variations in New Hampshire and found that the prices 
commercial insurers pay to New Hampshire hospitals vary widely, even after adjusting for 
the acuity and complexity (called “casemix”) of their patient populations.30  Unadjusted 
inpatient average prices varied by a factor of 4 from highest to lowest, and outpatient 
average prices varied by a factor of 2.4.  Even after adjusting for casemix, both inpatient 
and outpatient average prices varied by more than a factor of 2. In addition, hospitals 
reported total margins ranging from a 5% loss up to a 22% profit, however there was no 
statistically significant correlation between a hospital’s total margin and its average prices.  
 
2.  UMass findings on New Hampshire’s health insurance market and provider payment 
system: In 2013, UMass collaborated with Freedman Healthcare to explore these findings 
further by interviewing key stakeholders and conducting additional analysis.31 
Key findings of this analysis included the following. 
•  “Every stakeholder interviewed expressed concerns about the high cost of health care 
in New Hampshire.”32 
•  “Stakeholders cited New Hampshire’s high deductibles and premiums as a 
significant issue.”33  
•  “Most providers interviewed said they have not observed competition among 
insurance companies. However, the carriers themselves felt they are very 
competitive.”34 
•  “Interviewees from multiple stakeholder categories mentioned that due to New 
Hampshire’s small population, the addition of new carriers would not improve 
                                                 
30 University of Massachusetts Medical School, “Analysis of Price Variations in New Hampshire Hospitals,” April 
2012, http://www.nh.gov/insurance/lah/documents/umms.pdf (accessed October 6, 2014). 
31 University of Massachusetts Medical School and Freedman Healthcare, “New Hampshire’s Health Insurance 
Market and Provider Payment System: An Analysis of Stakeholder Views,” June 2013, 
http://www.nh.gov/insurance/reports/documents/nh_himkt_provpay_sys.pdf (accessed October 6, 2014). 
32 Ibid., p. 1. 
33 Ibid., p. 1. 
34 Ibid., p. 3. 
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health care costs or delivery and the risk pool is not large enough to support 
additional carriers.”35 
•  “Most providers interviewed said they feel powerless when it comes to negotiations 
with health plans.”36 
•  “When asked about hospital competition, interviewees in all stakeholder groups 
recognized that due to the state’s geography, there is little competition among New 
Hampshire hospitals, except in the cities of Nashua and Manchester.”37 
•  “Carriers interviewed agreed there is little competition among physicians, and they 
find it difficult to negotiate competitive rates among physicians that have developed 
geographic monopolies.”38 
•  “A number of providers expressed interested in taking on risk, though one hospital 
was not interested because they do not have the infrastructure or skills needed to 
manage population health.”39 
 
Finally, UMass and Freedman Healthcare identified the following recommendations made by 
stakeholders from one or more market sectors. 
 
•  “The state should develop a shared long-term vision on promoting the health of the 
New Hampshire population, improving quality of care, and containing health care 
costs. Align policies and regulations to support the vision, for example, to guide 
decisions regarding investing in payers’ and providers’ infrastructure;  
•  The state should continue to support transparency and the development of tools that 
make information, utilization and cost data more accessible to providers, payers and 
consumers;  
•  The NHID should play a convening role in the development of new payment 
models, developing guidelines for new models, and supporting developmental 
pilots;  
•  The NHID and other state agencies should review and evaluate stakeholder 
payment issues to determine whether to intervene in the market;  
•  The state should increase investment in primary care;  
•  The state should reform the Certificate of Need process.”40  
 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 3. 
36 Ibid., p. 3. 
37 Ibid., p. 3. 
38 Ibid., p. 3. 
39 Ibid., p. 6. Employer financial risk for costs of health coverage for employees—that is, whether the employer 
wants to risk owing addition funds if employees’ health care costs rise or would prefer to let an insurance carrier 
assume that risk—is different from provider financial risk—which involves holding providers financially 
accountable for poor patient outcomes or patient cost of care.  
40 Ibid, p. 7. 
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3.  Legal considerations raised by Manatt: As part of this multi-stage analysis of payment 
reform in New Hampshire, Manatt Health Solutions (Manatt) performed an in-depth 
analysis of selected key legal issues, which was summarized in a report released in June, 
2014 (Manatt Report).41  Manatt identified the following as areas for further consideration 
by New Hampshire policymakers:  
 
•  “Implementing a regulatory approach to provider risk-bearing that would permit or 
even encourage self-insured plans to adopt provider payment reforms”; 
•   “Evaluating circumstances when it would be appropriate to relax state anti-kickback 
restrictions on Medicaid contracting that could inhibit provider payment reform”; 
and 
•  “Adopting antitrust enforcement policies similar to those adopted by federal 
regulators and evaluating whether further action is appropriate to protect providers 
from antitrust liability.” 
 
We have referenced the Manatt Report where it is applicable to our payment reform 
recommendations. 
III.  Approach 
 
Developing recommendations for payment reform is a difficult and wide-ranging task. We 
broke this task down into the following steps. 
 
1.  Identify a “wide net” of potential options for reform. Based on review of literature and 
current practice nationally, we identified a comprehensive list of potential candidates for 
payment reform.  
 
2.  Identify criteria for narrowing the net. We used a set of criteria necessary for success of a 
payment reform system. 
 
3.  Cull candidates to “narrow net” options. By carefully evaluating the wider list of options 
against the criteria, we reduced the number of potential reforms to a smaller set of options 
viable in New Hampshire.  
 
4.  Group options into comprehensive payment reform recommendations, short-term steps, 
and stand-alone actions.  
 
5.  Identify legal and regulatory barriers affecting “narrow net” options. For the reduced list 
of options, we identified legal and regulatory barriers that present in this arena, including 
federal and state law and regulation, incorporating key legal analyses and policy 
considerations provided by Manatt on these issues.   
                                                 
41 Manatt Health Solutions, “Provider Payment Reform in New Hampshire: Legal Considerations for Policymakers,” 
June 2014 (Manatt report) at pp. 1-2; see full report for detailed analysis.  
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A. Wide Net  
 
In order to develop a set of recommendations for NHID to consider in developing a strategy to 
contain health care costs in the state, Compass and UMass surveyed the variety of strategies 
undertaken or considered by other states to identify the full range of options, including 
regulatory, payment and service delivery reform, and employer- and individual-focused 
approaches.  These options are listed in detail in Appendix A.   
 
B. Cr iter ia  a nd Approa ch to Na r rowing Net 
 
We evaluated each of the approaches in Appendix A for whether it produces the conditions 
required to create incentives for cost containment, its potential to meet the goals of cost 
containment in New Hampshire, its likely effects on stakeholders, the associated administrative 
and legal hurdles, and alignment with health care reform efforts in Medicaid, Medicare and in 
neighboring states.42  A summary of our assessment in each of these dimensions follows. 
1. Conditions Required to Create Incentives for Cost Containment 
 
We define four factors that are necessary to move reform forward successfully. These 
are: 
 
•  Incentives 
•  Consensus  
•  Collaboration 
•  Consequences 
 
Each of these factors is addressed in turn below. 
a) System that Creates Incentives 
A fundamental test of effective payment reform is whether it advances the system’s ability 
to reward providers and health plans for providing high quality services for the lowest 
price.  A well-functioning, competitive market would create these incentives on its own.  
In the absence of a well-functioning market, the state should implement policy initiatives 
that create these incentives in other ways.  These incentives must be established in ways 
that are appropriate for the size and location of providers and health plans. 
b) Forum for Building Consensus 
Buy-in from key stakeholders, including providers, payers, employers, consumers, and 
state agencies, is necessary to maximize the chances of successful reform.  Building 
                                                 
42 The information in this report is intended as a framework for policy strategy, and is not intended as legal advice. 
The NHID would need to consult with attorneys licensed to practice law in New Hampshire for legal advice on any 
specific state law issues.  
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consensus requires a broad forum or vehicle to address and compromise on competing 
considerations among various stakeholders, as well as sufficient impetus to push to 
conclusion.  The impetus could be statutory language requiring an outcome, creating 
benefits for achieving the outcome, or creating consequences for failure to hit certain 
milestones. 
c) Infrastructure to Facilitate Collaboration  
Moving to new payment models requires development of infrastructure related to data 
sources, information exchange, provider risk bearing, quality measurement, and other 
aspects of delivery and financing. Aligning the development across payers, including 
Medicaid, to the greatest degree possible will significantly reduce the total effort and cost 
required to implement payment reform. Both the state and providers will likely benefit 
from reduced administrative burden when initiatives are aligned. Interaction between the 
various constituencies will help share best practices and cross-fertilize ideas as the 
inevitable challenges of conceiving and implementing such a dramatic change to the 
payment system. 
d) Consequences that Motivate Active Participation 
Active participation by key participants is crucial to the success of any reform effort.  
Payment reform presents an absolutely fundamental shift in the business model of 
providers, requiring changes in methods of contracting, financial and risk management, 
information technology, strategic planning and alliances, and clinical coordination and 
communication. These changes are difficult, expensive, and risky to execute successfully. 
There is the possibility that the current impetus toward payment reform may sputter and 
reverse, as the movement toward capitation did in the 1990s.  Moreover, reform may 
entail changes that affect the real or perceived financial outcomes for key stakeholders.  
As a result, some participants could take a wait-and-see attitude, or “dip in a toe” to hedge 
against different courses the reform movement might take.  
 
Consequences for not participating in payment reform can provide motivation to 
overcome the hurdles described above. Any such consequences should be appropriate for 
the size and location of providers and carriers, and to the extent possible focus on positive 
outcomes for compliance, as well as transparency with respect to performance against the 
target behavior. 
2. Potential to Meet Goals 
a) Political Feasibility in New Hampshire 
Efforts that have been successful in New Hampshire have built upon the state’s culture, 
which values individual choice.  Approaches that require heavy regulation by government 
were considered to be less feasible in New Hampshire. 
 
b) Potential to Contain Total Health Care Costs in Southern/Central New 
Hampshire 
The health care markets of Southern and Central New Hampshire are quite different from 
Northern New Hampshire, so approaches that are viable in one region may not work as 
well in the other.  In Southern and Central New Hampshire, there are existing large 
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hospital systems and ACOs: the Southern New Hampshire Health System, and the 
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Health System.  These large networks have the infrastructure to 
transition to new payment methods and models of care. 
c) Potential to Contain Total Health Care Costs in Northern New Hampshire 
There are fewer health care providers in Northern New Hampshire, and the hospitals in 
this region are considered critical access providers.  New payment and system delivery 
models must be designed carefully to encourage efficiency while protecting solvency of 
critical capacity.  
d) Likely Effect on Quality of Care 
Some cost containment approaches, such as patient centered medical homes and ACOs, 
are designed specifically to improve care quality and include paying for performance on 
quality benchmarks, while others only focus on managing to a budget.  Approaches such 
as high deductible insurance plans that do not incorporate clinical changes to improve 
care coordination and performance on established quality measures may have negative 
health care quality impacts.  
e) Likely Effect on Access to Care 
Cost containment approaches that would be likely to limit the availability of health care 
services, by incenting providers to accept only healthy patients, or creating a financial 
disincentive for providers to stay in the market would have a negative impact on access to 
care.  ACO models need to be carefully designed to include risk adjusted payments and 
quality metrics to minimize the risk. 
f) Likely Effect on Utilization of Care  
Cost containment approaches that focus on managing to a budget are intended to lower 
provision of unnecessary care that is currently incentivized by fee-for-service payments.  
This approach can succeed if utilization is lowered only for unnecessary care, rather than 
encouraging too much utilization control of needed treatment.  
 
3. Potential Impact on Key Stakeholders 
a) Consumer Cost Sharing 
Certain individual approaches, such as high deductible plans with health savings 
accounts, are intended to reduce unnecessary utilization and incent cost conscious health 
care purchasing by consumers by having them bear a higher percentage of their health 
care costs. Such strategies may help mitigate growth of health care costs, but primarily 
shift costs to consumers. This approach might also result in consumers forgoing needed 
care, particularly if consumer-friendly price and quality information and decision aids are 
not available.43 
                                                 
43 Reddy, Sheila R., et al. "Impact of a High-deductible Health Plan on Outpatient Visits and Associated Diagnostic 
Tests." Medical care 52.1 (2014): 86-92. 
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b) Consumer Empowerment  
Consumer-directed health care initiatives are designed to provide information to the 
consumer to be able to make informed decisions based on cost, quality and clinical 
recommendations.  Public websites with clear provider and carrier specific information 
on cost and quality can promote consumer empowerment and choice selection by 
providing this critical information.  
c) Employer and Individual Premiums and Cost Sharing 
Employers and individuals have a strong desire to see premium increases slow down or 
reverse.  An effective cost containment policy should mitigate the growth of premiums as 
well as out of pocket costs to consumers.  
d) Provider Revenues and Provider Solvency 
Approaches that contain costs by reducing provider revenues may lead to issues with 
provider solvency.  Hospitals need an operating margin that allows them to invest in 
maintaining and improving their staff, equipment and infrastructure to maintain quality 
and remain viable business entities.  Cost containment efforts need to result in a system 
where providers are still able to remain solvent (though this may entail a change in their 
structure to do so, in some cases) and continue to provide needed services to the 
populations they serve. Otherwise, New Hampshire could experience more consolidation 
of the health care market, which can drive up costs, or the state could potentially lose 
critical access hospitals in rural markets. 
e) Health Plans and Ability for New Carriers to Enter New Hampshire Market 
We reviewed the potential impact of cost containment approaches on health plans. We 
identified and eliminated certain approaches that appeared likely to discourage health 
plans from either remaining in or entering the New Hampshire market, giving fewer 
options for New Hampshire residents.  
f) State Government Costs 
As a state with no income tax and a history of constrained government spending, we 
considered options that required large government investments in order to implement to 
be less viable.  
 
4. Other Items that Were Considered in Narrowing the Options to Those that 
Were Feasible 
a) Administrative Costs and Hurdles 
The administrative costs and hurdles to implement cost containment strategies were 
considered in the review of options.  Some of the administrative considerations are 
described in the legal hurdles and considerations sections of this report.  
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b) Alignment with Medicare and Medicaid 
Because the costs can be reduced through simplification of health care administration, we 
reviewed whether suggested approaches aligned with Medicare and Medicaid 
approaches.  
c) Alignment with Neighboring States 
As some health care providers provide services across borders, we reviewed whether any 
approaches were consistent with approaches taken in Vermont, Maine and Massachusetts, 
or represented any cross border issues for providers serving residents of two states.  
d) Legal Considerations 
We analyzed the legal steps, hurdles and potential risks that may be raised by each of the 
payment reform options evaluated for this project. A detailed analysis of legal 
considerations is included in Appendix B of this report.  
 
C. Na r rowing the Net 
Based on our analysis of all of the above factors, we narrowed the options described in the 
wide net to a select group of recommendations.  To identify which combination of options 
would be most effective, we focused on those mechanisms that, in the absence of a well-
functioning competitive market, would be most likely to create a system that would reward 
providers for containing costs, while improving or maintaining quality and access.  We 
applied the criteria above to select mechanisms that build on current initiatives and some 
regional approaches, and which would be most feasible to implement based on stakeholder 
feedback and the political climate of New Hampshire.   
We then grouped the available mechanisms into comprehensive approaches that, as a 
group, would create the fundamental components of a well-functioning health care system, 
described in more detail above:  a system that creates incentives for cost containment and 
quality improvement; incentives for building consensus among providers, payers and other 
stakeholders; infrastructure to facilitate collaboration among stakeholders; and 
consequences for not actively working to create the new system.  
The results of these efforts are three recommended payment reform strategies that New 
Hampshire could implement to achieve its goals.  We also identify a number of steps that 
New Hampshire could take in the shorter term to move its system closer to being able to 
implement the longer term options.  Finally, we list two stand-alone actions that New 
Hampshire could take to contain some health care costs. 
 




We recommend three comprehensive approaches to payment reform, four short-term steps the 
state could take to move closer to payment reform, and two stand-alone actions to addressing 
high health care spending in New Hampshire.  The state may choose to pursue one or more of 
these approaches. 
 
A. Comprehensive Approaches 
1. Payment Reform Strategy 1: Publicly Report Progress Against Benchmarks 
a) PATH: Establish Statewide Benchmarks, Standard Basis of Payment, 
Reporting, Consequences 
This option aims to establish market-like incentives for cost containment and quality 
improvement by establishing statewide benchmarks, as well as consequences for failing 
to meet those benchmarks.  
 
Benchmarks: New Hampshire could establish a benchmark for growth in total statewide 
health expenditures per capita.  The state could consider tying the benchmark to an 
economic indicator, such as the growth in state domestic product, the Consumer Price 
Index, or the growth in national health expenditure.  The state should also establish 
appropriate measures of quality of care by service, tied to national benchmarks. 
 
Trusted Entity: The state should consider carefully who should be entrusted with setting 
the benchmarks.  One choice is to require a state agency to take on this responsibility, 
after consulting with interested parties.  Another option is to establish a Commission 
comprised of impartial members with specific expertise to establish the benchmarks.  
Appointing authority for one or more members could be granted to several individuals, 
such as the Governor, Attorney General, Senate President and Speaker of the House.  
 
Measurement and Transparency: The state would then analyze its health care data to 
determine whether the growth in total statewide health expenditures exceeded the 
benchmark.  The state would also determine whether individual health care providers’ 
and insurers’ health expenditures grew at rates greater than the cost benchmark and 
whether their services met the quality benchmarks.  The results of this analysis should be 
posted publicly. The state should include a process by which health care entities can 
appeal this determination.  
 
The state could further require all payers to pay using the same basis of payment, such as 
payment per Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) for inpatient care (using the same software 
and same version) and payment per Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS) unit 
for professional services.  This change would ease comparison of payment levels across 
payers and providers.  Alternatively, the state could convert existing payments to a 
standard basis for purposes of measurement and transparency. 
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Consequences: The state should establish clear consequences that would be imposed 
under certain conditions.  Consequences should be imposed on a health care entity 
because of excessive cost growth if (i) the growth in total statewide health expenditures 
exceeds the benchmark, (ii) the growth in the health care entity’s health expenditures 
exceeds the benchmark, and (iii) the entity’s average costs, adjusted for health status, 
exceed the average of its peers, or potentially a threshold above the average of its peers.  
Consequences should be imposed for poor quality if an entity’s quality is below its peers 
and it fails to meet improvement targets. 
 
Consequences could be imposed with increasing severity over time.  For example, the 
first step could be to post the name of the entity and the benchmark it failed to meet, the 
second step could be to require a performance improvement plan, the third step could be 
to impose a fine, and the final step could be to impose state rate-setting on the offending 
entity.  
b) Legal, Administrative and Cost Considerations for Strategy 1 
Statutory Authority: This option builds on the considerable experience and investment 
that New Hampshire has made in data collection, analysis and transparency.  The state 
could establish benchmarks and post measurements against the benchmarks without any 
legal change.  However, legislation would be required to impose any further 
consequences. 
 
Governance: The state would need to establish by law which entity is responsible for 
each key component: establishing the benchmarks, determining whether the state as a 
whole exceeded the benchmarks, determining whether individual health care entities 
exceeded the benchmarks, and imposing consequences.  These functions could be 
assigned to one or more entities.  In Vermont, the Green Mountain Care Board is 
responsible for all of these functions.  The Green Mountain Care Board approves hospital 
budgets and can require a hospital to re-cast its budget to come in under the benchmark.  
Maryland’s Health Services Cost Review Commission sets benchmarks based on growth 
in Gross State Product, and sets hospital rates within that benchmark.  In Massachusetts, 
the Health Policy Commission sets the benchmarks and imposes consequences, while the 
Center for Health Information and Analysis measures whether the state and individual 
health care entities exceed the cost growth benchmark.  
 
If New Hampshire is concerned that increased provider consolidation may contribute to 
driving up provider prices, it may also establish increased monitoring of and control over 
merger activity, and would need to identify which agency(ies) were assigned with these 
functions.  
 
Cost: The state would need to obtain funding for staff or consultants to (i) conduct the 
analysis required to establish the benchmarks, (ii) determine whether the state as a whole 
exceeded the benchmarks, (iii) determine whether individual health care entities 
exceeded the benchmarks, and (iv) impose consequences. Each of these four steps could 
require the full-time work of several state employees or consultants.  
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2. Payment Reform Strategy 2:  Promote Alternative Payment Methods  
a) PATH: Establish Multi-Stakeholder  Commission Charged with Adopting Model 
Contr act; Author ize State to Regulate Rates if the Commission  Fails to Make Progress; 
Regulation  of Provider  Risk 
Transition to alternative payment methods and ACOs: The second option aims to shift, 
system-wide, carriers, other purchasers, and providers to new contracting models that 
contain features needed to implement payment and system reforms.  Under this option the 
state would transition to more widespread use of new payment methods that are 
alternatives to fee-for-service, and to more use of coordinated, integrated systems of care 
delivery, especially ACOs. 44  The federal ACO programs45 have recently received 
governmental and media attention for their cost saving results.46  As the state transitions 
to new contracting models with ACOs and other provider organizations, it should also 
consider taking steps to regulate provider risk-bearing, to protect provider solvency and 
service delivery.  
New Hampshire already has several ACOs, including Dartmouth-Hitchcock Health, the 
Granite Health Network, North Country ACO, NH Accountable Care Partners and the 
coordinating initiative managed under the Citizens Health Initiative’s grant-funded ACO 
demonstration.47  These initiatives are aiming to demonstrate that ACOs, global 
payments, and payment for quality can be successful within the state.  A new Medicare 
ACO initiative, the ACO Investment Model, will offer entities money up-front to 
transform their practices.  The model will also prioritize selection of rural ACO 
applicants.48 
                                                 
44 An ACO is a group of health care providers that agree to be collectively accountable for the cost, quality, and care 
of a population across the continuum.  See Elliott S. Fisher et. al., “Creating Accountable Care Organizations:  The 
Extended Hospital Medical Staff,” Health Affairs 26, no. 1 (2007), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/1/w44.full.pdf+html (accessed October 8, 2014); Elliott Fisher, “Elliott 
Fisher: Shift to Accountable Care Organizations,” Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2013, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2013/07/19/elliott-fisher-shift-to-accountable-care-organizations/ (accessed October 8, 
2014).  
45 ACOs rose to national prominence through the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), established pursuant 
to Section 3022 of the ACA (2010). Since then, ACOs have proliferated, both in the MSSP and Pioneer ACO 
Programs (also referred to as federal ACO programs), as well as in the commercial market. 
46United States Department of Health and Human Services, “New Affordable Care Act Tools and Payment Models 
Deliver $372 Million in Savings, Improve Care,” September 26, 2014, 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/09/20140916a.html (accessed October 8, 2014); United States Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Fact Sheets:  Medicare ACOs Continue to Succeed in Improving Care, Lowering 
Cost Growth,” September 16, 2014, http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2014-Fact-
sheets-items/2014-09-16.html (accessed October 8, 2014); Priyanka Dayal McCluskey, “Health Care Pilot Shows 
Progress in Controlling Costs,” Boston Globe, September 18, 2014, 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/09/17/health-care-pilot-shows-progress-controlling-
costs/vaIEhpZaXyJnOAEhKvBjEI/story.html (accessed October 8, 2014). 
47 New Hampshire Citizens Health Initiative, “Accountable Care Project,” 
http://citizenshealthinitiative.org/accountable-care-project (accessed October 8, 2014). Two main areas included in 
the Citizens initiative 2014-2015 are a program for coordinated care for patients with depression and another chronic 
condition, and implementing a coordinated model for patients with hypertension. 
48 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, “ACO Investment Model,”  http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/ACO-
Investment-Model/ (accessed on 10/27/2014) 
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However, movement toward capitation of providers in the 1990s failed for reasons that 
include inadequate infrastructure and expertise on the part of providers.  It is critically 
important to develop more deliberate public policy to support and protect both providers 
and consumers from negative consequences, including the retreat to inflationary fee-for-
service payment that followed the failed capitation experiments.  If negative 
consequences from these contracts occur, or there is a retreat from the current interest in 
this approach, there are few incentives toward further use of these models in New 
Hampshire, given the absence of competition or pressures to contain costs and improve 
quality. Therefore, external incentives and supportive steps to move the market toward 
these new, cost-saving models of payment and care delivery should be developed.  
Model Contract: To move the system to these new payment methods to achieve cost 
containment goals, the state should devise a model contract which contains alternative 
payment methodologies (Model Contract) and share it with key stakeholders, including 
providers, payers, consumers, and employers. Specifically, payers and providers would 
be incentivized to use the Model Contract as a basis for their contracting, including 
payment mechanisms that are alternatives to fee-for-service, payment for performance on 
established quality measures, and sharing in risk for providers able to take on risk.  The 
state could provide training on the use of the Model Contract, offer technical assistance 
on the “nuts and bolts” of entering into alternative contracts.  We recommend that New 
Hampshire coordinate across agencies to offer a clear path for organizations entering into 
these arrangements.    
State and Federal Use of Model Contracts: State agencies have been using model 
contracts routinely in the managed care contracting arena, as part of the procurement 
process, for several decades.  For example, the California Department of Health Care 
Services posts sample contracts that include the varying models of managed care in 
California.49 Texas also uses a Uniform Managed Care contract for their Medicaid 
managed care program.50  In Massachusetts, a contract model known as the “alternative 
quality contract” devised and used by a major insurer in the state created part of the early 
foundation and path for the state’s recent legislation (chapter 224) on health care cost 
containment.51  More recently, Massachusetts has launched a program called the Primary 
Care Payment Reform initiative, with bundled payments, shared savings, and coordinated 
care requirements, which utilizes a Model Contract.52  On the federal level, the contracts 
                                                 
49 California Department of Health Care Services, “Medi-Cal Managed Care Boilerplate Contracts, 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/provgovpart/Pages/MMCDBoilerplateContracts.aspx (accessed October 8, 2014).   
50 Texas Health and Human Services Commission, “Uniform Managed Care Terms and Conditions,” 
http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/medicaid/managed-care/UniformManagedCareContract.pdf (accessed October 8, 2014). 
51 Deval Patrick, Address to the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, February 17, 2011, 
http://www.mass.gov/governor/pressoffice/speeches/021711-greater-boston-chamber-of-commerce.html (accessed 
October 8, 2014); Commonwealth of Massachusetts, “Patrick-Murray Administration Proposes Comprehensive 
Health Care Cost-Containment Legislation,” February 17, 2011, 
http://www.mass.gov/governor/pressoffice/pressreleases/2011/administration-proposes-comprehensive-health.html 
(accessed October 8, 2014). The alternative quality contract contained some of the key components and laid the 
groundwork for current ACO contracting in the state. 
52 Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services, “Primary Care Payment Reform Initiative,” 
http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/newsroom/masshealth/providers/primary-care-payment-reform-initiative.html 
(accessed October 8, 2014). 
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being entered into for the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) ACO program 
contain certain core components, used across the nation by many MSSP ACOs.53  
New Hampshire may use these existing models in designing and releasing a Model 
Contract in the ACO arena, as there are a number of key similarities (e.g. payment for 
performance on quality measures, global or other alternative payments (in the managed 
care context, capitation), and requirements regarding risk). We recommend the Model 
Contract approach as a more dynamic mechanism to truly move the state forward in 
achieving its cost containment goals.  
b) The Model Contr act  Could Contain  the Following Features: 
•  Global payments putting providers on a yearly, risk-adjusted budget.  
Slower increase in rate growth over the term of the agreement than under 
traditional multi-year fee-for-service contracts; coupled with the potential for 
providers to earn a higher overall total for high performance on all quality 
measures (see below). 
•  Shared savings methods in which providers may share in savings, and in some 
cases, losses for performance on quality and overall savings under the agreement. 
The agreement would include a set of established quality measures, and payment 
would be conditioned on meeting the standards set forth in those measures.  
Measures would incentivize care coordination across the ACO (for example, 
reduction in hospital readmissions), and would be balanced between inpatient and 
outpatient measures.  
•  Payments would be made to ACOs and other providers able to take on financial 
risk, which may then distribute payments to providers participating in the ACO 
(depending on the structure of the provider/ACO-integrated or established by 
contracts).  
The participating providers could, separately, agree to a mechanism for sharing in 
the gains or losses under the contract.  
•  Monitoring and grievance/appeal process requirements to protect consumers and 
ensure against underutilization. 
Additionally, the Model Contract could require care coordination among different 
providers that are part of ACOs or integrated care organizations, and infrastructure and 
mechanisms to share in risk and reward from contract performance.  
                                                 
53 Peter Wehrwein, “The ACO Contract:  Four Parts of the Basic Chassis,” Managed Care, June 2013, 
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2013/6/aco-contract-four-parts-basic-chassis (accessed October 8, 
2014). 
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Provider Risk: This new contracting model could place performance risk on providers 
and new provider organizations such as ACOs, though not all providers would be 
encouraged to take on risk.  Thresholds could be established for which providers would 
be permitted to enter into (or continue) with downside risk contracts (see discussion on 
regulation of provider risk below at Section IV.2.d).  The Model Contract should also be 
consistent with other models already in use throughout the state by existing ACOs and 
integrated care entities.  
There are a number of advantages to issuing a Model Contract.  The state’s model would 
clearly demonstrate the nature of the contracting mechanism and policy direction towards 
which the state seeks to have providers move.  Additionally, issuing a Model Contract 
will specify what is meant by terms such as alternative payment methods, ACOs, and 
shared savings for performance on quality, and how these concepts are to be implemented 
together. 
Educate Stakeholders: The state could provide learning collaboratives, public meetings, 
and trainings on what is needed to enter into the Model Contract, and the way it is 
implemented. The educational program could identify and address issues raised by Model 
Contract implementation and offer technical support.  This approach and support is 
consistent with the SIM grant application submitted by New Hampshire.  We recommend 
that the state coordinate across government agencies to provide a clear path for 
organizations entering into these arrangements. 
However, it is unlikely that without further action, the Model Contract will take hold 
enough to cause a system wide shift with all payers and providers in the state to using 
alternative payment methods, and becoming or joining an ACO.  The Model Contract 
may be of interest to some providers and ACOs, but it may not obtain sufficient traction 
and use to have much impact, without further steps. 
These steps –devising a Model Contract and educating all stakeholders about the urgency 
of its need for health care cost containment statewide – are necessary but not sufficient to 
transform the market and bring down health care costs in New Hampshire.  In order to 
have the greatest cost containment impact, New Hampshire should pair its Model 
Contract work with incentives.  One way to do this is by establishing a multi-stakeholder 
commission as described in the next section.  
c) One Path to Payment Reform: Establish Multi-Stakeholder  Commission 
One tactic that could be used to achieve agreement among payers and providers on a 
Model contract is to use a legislatively created special commission.  The stakeholder 
commission for this option would have a more specific charge than the short-term 
commission option described in Section IV.B.3.  
Commission Charge: The special commission could be given a very specific charge in 
the legislation: to evaluate the state’s Model Contract, and either recommend that it be 
broadly adopted, or propose a reasonable alternative (“Stakeholder Model”), containing 
similar features.  The commission charge could specify that if stakeholders do not agree 
to adopt the Model Contract, they must arrive, collectively, at an alternative, but similar 
agreement.  The stakeholders would need to align on payment, care delivery, and quality 
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performance features of contracts they would use going forward, that the state would then 
review and approve.  The Commission could evaluate issues such as the size of providers 
which would be required, over time, to shift to the Model Contract or Stakeholder Model, 
and other key issues, to be specified in the legislation. The Commission would be 
required to meet regularly (with a minimum set number of times established in the 
legislation), and those meetings would be open to the public. The Commission would be 
charged with issuing a final report on its recommendations and choices within no more 
than one year from the date it is formed.  
Commission Advantages: There are a number of advantages to establishing a 
Commission, rather than trying to legislate the desired result at the outset.  One clear 
advantage is to obtain stakeholder support and buy-in for the payment reform and system 
delivery reform ideas the state seeks to promote.  Another is to create a sense of shared 
responsibility among the different stakeholders, and an understanding that they are all “in 
it together.”  Additionally, the meetings would promote a level of transparency, trust, and 
obligation among the participants; and the threat of impending rate regulation would 
encourage more efficient, goal-oriented negotiation and consensus building.  Finally, the 
multi-stakeholder commission approach would also avoid the pitfalls New Hampshire has 
faced with more prescriptive legislation attempting to regulate health care cooperative 
agreements, which has not succeeded in gaining passage in the state.54 
Consequences-Regulation of Provider Rates: If the stakeholders do not arrive at such an 
agreement, identifying the key features of this new reimbursement model independently, 
and also refuse to adopt the Model Contract devised by the state, New Hampshire could 
start setting rates across the board for ACOs, hospitals and other providers.  The state 
could use the threat of regulation of provider rates with carriers as a way to motivate 
consensus among stakeholders.  Specifically, if stakeholders failed to agree either to use 
the Model Contract or devise a similar Stakeholder Model, the state could begin 
regulating rates, setting a cap on provider fee-for-service (and potentially other) rates.   
Providers would be given the opportunity to control costs voluntarily, using either a state-
issued Model Contract or another contract with terms the state approves as achieving 
similar cost containment goals.  The state would only exercise its rate setting authority if 
the stakeholders failed to agree to use the Model Contract or Stakeholder Model.  The 
legislation authorizing this approach should make clear that the state’s regulatory 
authority would only be exercised in this manner.  The state should have discretion as to 
when, and whether, to exercise this targeted authority to regulate provider rates.55  
Without the potential ability to regulate provider costs, the state’s issuance of a Model 
Contract is unlikely to succeed in bringing down overall health care costs in the state.   
                                                 
54 New Hampshire State Senate Bill 308, 2014 Session, 
http://gencourt.state.nh.us/bill_status/bill_status.aspx?lsr=2682&sy=2014&sortoption=&txtsessionyear=2014&q=1 
(accessed October 8, 2014).  
55 NHID could be the regulating agency, and regulate carrier rates with providers, or another government agency 
could be designated to have authority to regulate rates in the event stakeholders could not come to consensus and use 
a new contract model. 
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The threat of broad rate regulation would operate as a strong force to motivate the 
stakeholders to work hard and negotiate well to reach agreement, either to use the Model 
Contract or devise their own Stakeholder Model, to be approved by the state, within the 
specified time frame.  By requiring that providers either lower their rates in carrier 
contracts and use a new Stakeholder Model voluntarily, or switch to the Model Contract 
which contains lower rate increases, the state would provide several options for 
stakeholders, to avoid rate setting.  
d) Provider  Risk Regulation 
As New Hampshire transitions to new models of contracting and payment, providers will 
be encouraged and incentivized to take on more financial responsibility for services.  
Providers and ACOs will transition to assuming the risk of gain and loss on performance 
and quality measures, and managing global payments for their patient populations.  To 
help ensure a smooth transition and protect against provider insolvency, the state should 
consider taking steps to regulate provider risk bearing.56 
Require certification of providers for risk level assumed: State-level insurance regulation 
of carrier solvency relies on a methodology of comprehensive risk assessment compared 
to financial assets known as “risk-based capital” (RBC), developed by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).  This allows a very helpful, if 
imperfect, way of determining whether insurers have the capital to absorb the 
underwriting and investment risks they take.  With the emergence of provider risk 
contracts, no parallel method exists to ensure provider solvency in the face of risks 
assumed.    
Methodology-Example: One state has taken a first step down this path, and recently 
issued guidelines for risk-bearing provider organizations (RBPO) to obtain independent 
review in order to qualify for issuance of a risk certificate.57  In order to obtain the risk 
certificate, the RBPO must have a “Review Statement” from an independent actuary that 
the RBPO meets the requirements for risk bearing laid out in the Guidelines.58  
 
The guidelines require the reviewing actuary to carry out a sequenced set of steps that 
become more extensive depending on whether or not it can be quickly established that the 
RBPO is capable of bearing the downside risk of its portfolio of risk contracts. The 
review in the first year of the certification program is retrospective (this will likely 
change to being prospective in future years), assessing the risk of the organizations 
contract during the current year already in progress.  In brief, the steps are as follows: 
 
1.) Calculate the total value of the budget target as defined by the contract 
documents and accepted payment/budget rates. 
                                                 
56 See Manatt report at page 15 for additional discussion and analysis of need for regulation of provider risk bearing. 
57 Massachusetts Division of Insurance, “Guidelines for Conducting Independent Reviews of Risk-Bearing Provider 
Organizations in Conjunction with the Application for Risk Certificates for the Term Beginning March 14, 2015,”  
September 26, 2014, http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/docs/doi/rbpo-guidlines09252014.pdf (accessed October 8, 2014). 
These guidelines and the requirement for a risk certificate are pursuant to the requirements set forth in 
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 176T and 211 CMR 155.06(2) and 155.07. 
58 In the first year only, the reviewer can be an actuary or other independent financial professional.  
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2.) Using independent information provided by the insurance regulator based on 
APCD-based estimates, calculate the expected level of budget target for each 
contract by using the combination of Payer and RBPO. 
3.) The projected loss or gain is the sum across contracts of item #1 minus sum 
across contracts of item #2, which is then reduced by the risk sharing percentage 
in each contract applied to its share of the total dollars. 
 
If the result of these calculations is positive, the reviewer can issue a positive review 
statement.  If negative, the review needs to continue with the following steps: 
 
4.) Calculate net working capital (current assets – current liabilities), as well as other 
sources of payment for losses (e.g., resources from parent organization).  
5.) Compare the net loss from #3 to the resources in #4 
 
If the net result of this comparison is positive, the review statement may be issued.  If not, 
additional information must be reviewed including the RBPOs infrastructure for 
managing claims risk, and terms in the contract that allow termination of the contract by 
the RPBO in case of financial risk.  The reviewer must then make a judgment as to 
whether these factors offset the potential loss sufficiently to merit issuance of a review 
statement. 
 
Methodological Considerations: The above-described methodology and approach 
represent a dramatic improvement over not assessing whether providers have the ability 
to assume risk. However, this approach does have significant limitations relative to a 
more well-developed approach like the NAIC’s RBC methodology for regulated health 
insurers.  These limitations include the following: 
 
1.) It does not assess risk in the usual sense meant in an insurance context, which is 
fundamentally tied to variations in claim expense outcomes.  It uses a reasonable 
approach drawing on publicly available information to make sure that budget 
targets are similar to historical costs for similar populations.  However, it does 
not assess potential variation in claims outcomes around the target and whether 
the organization has the financial means to absorb random variations in claims 
expense. The claim target could equal the historical level of spending, but if 
random variation causes actual claims to be 3% higher than the target, the review 
steps had already stopped after determining that the target was reasonable and do 
not proceed to assess financial strength to absorb the random variation. 
2.) Hospitals have many other sources of risk that are not assessed by this method.  
The RBC formula attempts to measure the related underwriting and investment 
risks of an insurer.  The approach described above does not assess risk from 
sources like fee-for-service contracts that are below cost, risk of government 
payment cuts, investment loss risk, medical liability risk, and other sources.  
 
Overall, this approach is admirable for being proactive, beginning the conversation on 
provider risk assumption, and capturing the primary and most important source of risk, 
which is whether the provider has negotiated appropriate budget targets with the carriers.  
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Minimum Size: A related issue that should be considered is the minimum size of the 
population to be served by an ACO contract.  In a small state like New Hampshire, the 
number of individuals that can be attributed to a specific payer and provider combination 
is often quite small.  As providers, ACOs, and other provider organizations transition to 
providing more integrated care, the state could consider establishing a minimum number 
of individuals attributable to a provider organization in order for that organization to 
participate in new payment models that involve provider risk bearing.  For example, the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program requires ACOs to cover at least 5,000 beneficiaries.59  
Some states have also used 5,000 as the minimum attribution number for ACO programs; 
New Hampshire could consider whether this minimum is appropriate for its payment 
reform initiatives.  
e) Path to Regulating Provider  Risk 
To achieve regulation of provider risk on a system-wide level, New Hampshire could 
take the following steps: 
Enact broad legislation: Enact legislation directing NHID to regulate provider risk in 
carrier contracts with providers (including ACOs) taking on significant risk. Options 
could include process (review, risk certificate) as well as substance (rules re: stop loss 
insurance, performance bonds, etc.).  
For the risk assessment to be comprehensive, the state could include Medicaid and other 
public payers as well as commercial carrier contracts.  The state could include in 
legislation provisions applicable to all providers taking on provider risk (e.g. require that 
they obtain risk certificates and meet any other requirements related to provider risk). 
Adopt Risk Certificate Requirements: Additionally, the state could consider requiring 
providers to obtain risk certificates prior to entering into/ renewing any contract under 
which they accept risk, unless they apply for and receive a waiver.  Legislation in this 
arena could establish broad criteria, with more specific details delegated to regulation by 
NHID.60  
The state could define the types of organizations that must apply for a risk certificate, 
including questions about new provider organizational structures and ACOs. The state 
will need to collect information on the nature of provider risk contracting arrangements, 
and determine what types of evidence it will need to adequately ensure provider solvency 
for providers that take on risk.  
Educate Stakeholders: The NHID could hold sessions with stakeholders on this issue of 
provider risk, to obtain more information about current risk-based provider contracting 
and other stakeholder concerns around new payment models.61  Once the state has 
                                                 
59 42 C.F.R. § 425.110. 
60 The approach described in this subsection is based on the approach in Massachusetts. See M.G.L. c. 176T. 
61 In Massachusetts, the Division of Insurance held special sessions on issues relating to the implementation of 
chapter 224 of the Acts of 2012, which focused largely on obtaining stakeholder input on regulation of provider risk.  
See Massachusetts Division of Insurance, “Division of Insurance, Health Policy Commission to Focus on Key 
Health Care Cost Containment Strategies,” March 21, 2013,  http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/press-releases/2013/doi-
hpc-focus-on-health-care-cost-containment.html (accessed October 8, 2014).  
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gathered sufficient information, NHID could promulgate regulations, which may include 
a transition period, with transitional waivers, to allow regulated parties to come into 
compliance with the new rules.   
Monitor Risk and Provider Solvency: As the state begins to regulate provider risk 
bearing, it could monitor the transitions in the market broadly, as well as changes to 
provider solvency status, to ensure that its regulatory approaches are appropriate and 
effective.  Where the state would be somewhat new to this area of regulation, regular 
monitoring and evaluation of the impact of provider risk bearing requirements would be 
important to their appropriate implementation and effectiveness in promoting payment 
reform goals. 
f) Path to Addressing Anti-Trust  Concerns62 
Provider payment reform can raise antitrust concerns, both at the state and federal levels.  
Mergers, affiliations, and consolidations may result from payment reforms, because 
larger organizations may be more advantageous for care integration and risk assumption 
purposes.  However, health care consolidation can still lead to higher prices due to market 
clout.  The state needs to balance these competing health reform concerns.  We 
recommend that New Hampshire communicate and coordinate its payment reform efforts 
across state agencies, including the state Attorney General office, to address these issues. 
Additionally, the New Hampshire Department of Justice could be given more powers to 
oversee mergers as incentives to consolidate increase.63   
As part of this coordination effort, New Hampshire should consider enacting state action 
immunity legislation. The theory of state action immunity is as follows: when a state 
establishes a program that encourages activity that might otherwise be viewed as 
anticompetitive, and the state establishes and implements a comprehensive process of 
supervision, the participants in the program may be able to receive immunity from federal 
anti-trust rules.64  The state would then invoke the state action immunity doctrine as 
needed, to promote specific elements of its policy agenda, such as new payment methods 
and programs to promote ACOs and integrated care.  If the state decides to invoke the 
state action immunity doctrine, it should consider ways in which it – through NHID, New 
Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, or another agency – can take an 
active and ongoing role in implementing and overseeing the integration or ACO 
                                                 
62 The information in this report is intended as a framework for policy strategy, and is not intended as legal advice. 
The NHID would need to consult with attorneys licensed to practice law in New Hampshire for legal advice on any 
specific state law issues.  
63 In Massachusetts, the state’s cost containment legislation expanded the power of the state and Office of the 
Attorney General to monitor and regulate market consolidations that may not rise to antitrust violations. M.G.L. c. 
12 § 11N. 
64 State action immunity doctrine is an evolving area of law.  Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed this 
doctrine, clarifying that state action immunity may only be invoked in certain specific circumstances, where the state 
has had an ongoing and active role (defined rather narrowly) in overseeing a clearly defined initiative and actively 
supervising its implementation and impact FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc,  33 S. Ct. 1003 (2013). To 
meet this standard, the state needs to be able to demonstrate clear and ongoing direct supervision of the 
implementation of the program in question in order for program participants to avoid antitrust liability.  Another 
case, The N.C. Bd. of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C. (2015) denied state action immunity to a state agency that was 
“controlled by active market participants.”  These cases could also affect the viability of state action immunity.   
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formation process.  Use of the state immunity doctrine should be targeted towards those 
programs that the state is actively promoting.   
 
These actions are within state control and provide some important potential anti-trust 
protections to stakeholders as the state transitions to new payment and system delivery 
approaches. 65   
g) Legal, Administrative and Cost Considerations for Strategy 2 
There are a number of additional steps the state could take to implement Strategy 2. The 
steps include enacting legislation to establish the commission and the authority to set 
rates if the model contract or approved alternative is not broadly adopted.  Additionally, 
the state could seek approval for Medicaid and Medicare participation, to include public 
payers in the new contracting and payment mechanisms.  Steps could be taken to 
encourage voluntary participation by self-insured entities.66  The state would need to 
obtain funding for staff or consultants to devise the Model Contract, participate in the 
stakeholder commission and evaluate the commission recommendations. 
These steps and related legal considerations are described in more detail in Appendix C. 
 
3.  Payment Reform Strategy 3: Strengthen Employer Purchasing Power  
 
PATH: Take Steps to Study Alternatives for Improving Purchaser Negotiating Position  
New Hampshire’s health care market is characterized by highly concentrated provider 
markets, a concentrated insurance market with a dominant player, and a relatively 
disaggregated and disorganized employer purchaser market.  In this market structure, it can be 
difficult to exert competitive pressure on providers, and relatively easy for insurers to mark up 
the cost of care and pass the bill along to employers.  Furthermore, solutions for the lack of 
competitiveness in provider and insurer markets are not obvious. This context makes 
exploration of ideas to strengthen the employer purchasing market worthwhile. 
 
One approach considered in the past is the use of a purchasing collaborative, sometimes called 
“HIPCs” (for Health Insurance Purchasing Collaboratives).  These are nonprofit or 
government entities that accept all small employers and offer employees of participating 
employers a choice of health plans.  These features distinguish HIPCs from association health 
plans, which aggregate purchasing power of employers but may have none of these features.67 
 
                                                 
65 A legal analysis performed by Manatt Health Solutions identified “adopting antitrust enforcement policies similar 
to those adopted by federal regulators and evaluating whether further action is appropriate to protect providers from 
antitrust liability” as “areas that merit further consideration by New Hampshire policymakers.”  See Manatt report at 
pp. 1-2 and 25-27 for additional analysis of anti-trust issues. 
66 Changes to existing commercial carrier laws may also be needed, including amending the statutory provisions of 
RSA 415 and RSA 420. 
67 Elliot K. Wicks and Mark A. Hall, “Purchasing cooperatives for small employers: performance and prospects," 
Milbank Quarterly 78, no. 4 (2000), 511-546. 
NHID Payment Reform Recommendations  
33 
Purchaser collaboratives have the potential to encounter antitrust issues, although this risk has 
been more theoretical than practical.68  However, attempts in the past to form and successfully 
operate HIPCs have failed to gain significant traction in part because their voluntary nature 
has allowed two vested interests to prevent the one thing that HIPCs need to succeed at their 
mission: scale.69  Both insurers, who stand to lose the high margins generated by small group 
plans, and insurance agents, who would lose commissions on sales for groups that joined a 
cooperative, have financial reasons to not support the success of HIPCs.  As HIPCs were 
launched in the 1990s, in states including California, Florida, North Carolina and many others, 
a chicken and egg problem prevented growth – without scale, discounts couldn’t be 
negotiated, and without discounts, scale couldn’t be achieved.  
 
In order to overcome these barriers, some form of legislative mandate or incentive could be 
necessary to generate the scale that would engender discounts.  A transition to a purchasing 
collaborative could be overseen by NHID, subject to its authority and review.  
 
However, such a step could be politically difficult, as a mandatory collaborative would be 
opposed by insurers, agents, and possibly even many of the businesses such a collaborative 
might benefit.  In recent years, small group health insurance profit margins in New Hampshire 
have been only slightly higher than large group margins,70 which appears to fail to support the 
most obvious argument for forming a collaborative.  However, it is possible that carrier 
overhead allocations conceal the level of profit on small group coverage.  Although the 
increased leverage on the buying side might help to dampen trend, particularly if the 
collaborative could coordinate with Medicaid managed care purchasing, this argument is more 
speculative and much less likely to be effective in a public policy process.  In addition, a 
successful purchasing collaborative would require funding for staffing and data systems. 
 
Overall, a purchasing collaborative as an option may not be a strong candidate for near-term 
pursuit as a policy, but it, or some other mechanism that allows increased coordination and 
efficiency on the part of purchasers, is an option that policymakers should keep in mind as 
they monitor market conditions in the small group sector going forward, as success in 
strengthening purchasers’ roles in the market will complement and support other strategies 
aimed at controlling cost growth. 
 
 
B.   Short-Term Recommendations 
The following short-term recommendations have immediate benefits, and they lay the 
groundwork for more comprehensive approaches later if they prove necessary and politically 
possible.  New Hampshire could take these steps in any order. 
 
                                                 
68 Francis H. Miller, “Health Insurance Purchasing Alliances:  Monopsony Threat or Procompetitive Rx for Health 
Sector Ills?” Cornell Law Review 79, Issue 6 (September 1994), 1546. 
69 Elliot K. Wicks and Mark A. Hall, “Purchasing cooperatives for small employers: performance and prospects," 
Milbank Quarterly 78, no. 4 (2000), 523. 
70 New Hampshire Insurance Department, “2012 Medical Cost Drivers,” December, 2013. 
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1. Continue to Expand Data Transparency 
The New Hampshire HealthCost website is a path breaking information resource for 
comparative costs on health care services that draws on the New Hampshire Comprehensive 
Healthcare Information System (CHIS), the state’s multi-payer claims database.  In the 
previous work commissioned by NHID, one recommendation was that “The state should 
continue to support transparency and the development of tools that make information, 
utilization and cost data more accessible to providers, payers and consumers.”71  Drawing on 
data already being collected by the State, there are several ways that New Hampshire can 
continue to innovate in transparency initiatives in ways that will provide important new 
information to consumers.  
a. Premium Transparency: In addition to the CHIS multi-payer claim database, NHID 
also collects from carriers the Supplemental Report (SR) data set.  The SR contains a 
detailed summary of health insurance products sold by licensed New Hampshire 
carriers, including premium, claims, membership, and actuarial value.  Actuarial 
value (AV) is an index of the relative benefit level of each product.  So, a product 
with an AV of 0.8 has 20% less benefit coverage value than a product with an AV of 
1.0.  By use of this index, plan coverage can be compared on a simple metric, even 
when benefit differences of covered services, deductibles, and copayments are 
complex.  The AV also can be used to adjust premiums to a common standardized 
benefit level basis, so that plan value comparisons can be made on an “apple and 




It is difficult for consumers to get a sense of whether the $75 difference in premium is 
“worth it” for the differences in the benefit structures, but the adjusted premium 
provides a valid comparison of value.  The first plan here is a better value for the 
money spent.73  
                                                 
71 University of Massachusetts Medical School and Freedman Healthcare, “New Hampshire’s Health Insurance 
Market and Provider Payment System: An Analysis of Stakeholder Views,” June 2013, 
http://www.nh.gov/insurance/reports/documents/nh_himkt_provpay_sys.pdf (accessed October 6, 2014) at 7 
72 The calculation would in practice be slightly more complicated.  The AV would adjust the medical portion of the 
premium, and then the AV-adjusted medical premium would be added to the administrative and profit charges. 
73 This approach is similar to but different from that used in the Federal Health Care Exchange.  Exchange plans are 
required to be set at one of four “metal levels” into Bronze, Silver, Gold, and Platinum categories, corresponding to 
actuarial values of 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9 respectively.  This restricts the available plans to those with benefits at or 
near to these specific actuarial value levels.  Outside the Exchange, plans can have any actuarial value level above 
 
"List" Premium Actuarial Value Adjusted Premium
$500.00 1.00 $500.00
$425.00 0.80 $531.25
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Because the SR data is provided after a plan year is over, it would not be available 
before purchase decisions were made.  It would provide useful general information on 
plan values that are likely to provide useful information for the subsequent year’s 
purchase, as well as being useful for retrospective analysis by the NHID. 
 
Because the AV is also provided in rate filings that carriers submit for approval 
before health plans are sold, calculation of AV-adjusted values may also be 
publishable before consumers purchase policies.  Publication of such information on a 
website would be a very powerful additional purchasing tool for consumers.  
Measurement of AV is imperfect but for the first time NHID is now collecting the 
information on a standardized basis, and application of this information to premiums 
would provide a dramatic improvement in information available to consumers.  This 
information could be used for shopping purposes in the non-group and small-group 
markets, and to benchmark plan costs in the large-group market. 
b. Universal Provider Price Transparency: Significant additional pricing transparency 
for provider services could be gained by taking the step of requiring all provider bills 
to include sufficient information for pricing using Medicare payment systems, so that 
prices for DRGs (inpatient services), APCs (Ambulatory Payment Classification for 
hospital outpatient services), and RBRVS (professional services) could be determined 
for all services in the CHIS.  This would require some billing conventions for 
provider bills.74 This would not require payment to be made via these methods, only 
that the bills include information that would then become available in the CHIS 
claims data set for analytical addition of pricing information by analysts using the 
CHIS.  By applying Medicare pricing information to the claims in the CHIS, the 
actual payments can be compared to the Medicare payment level that would apply, 
and rigorously case-mix adjusted average prices could be developed in aggregate for 
each provider and for any sub-category of payers and services.  This would 
dramatically increase the ability to measure and compare provider prices in a 
standardized way. 
c. Increased Quality Transparency: As the public becomes more aware of provider 
prices, one unintended consequence could be that consumers equate higher prices 
with higher quality.  This would undermine transparency’s goal of cost containment.  
To address this concern, New Hampshire could report quality measure data alongside 
price information for providers.  This approach would require some standardized 
quality measurement across providers and other health care entities.  Standardization 
of quality measures is also recommended in order to reduce each provider’s 
administrative burden.  
                                                                                                                                                             
the required minimum level, and so the ability to compare plans value directly  is not obvious.  Using the available 
actuarial value information as suggested to standardize the premium levels would serve a similar purpose of making 
costs comparable. 
74 For an example of changes required in provider billing for DRGs, see: 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/provgovpart/Documents/W141%20SDN%20Enclosure-
DRG%20Pricing%20Requirements%20(Chapter%207%20of%20PDD).pdf. 
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2. Leverage Available Resources  
The State of New Hampshire obtained a SIM design award in the first round of SIM funding, 
and has applied for additional design funds in round two, for which announcement of awards 
should occur by the time this report is published.75  The amount requested for the round two 
funds is $2 million for additional design, which includes the design of regional technical 
cooperatives to help providers develop the infrastructure to operate and manage innovative 
payment models.  If approved, other payment reform activities in New Hampshire should be 
coordinated with the activities that take place under this grant.  
 
Also made available by CMS have been much larger “model test grants” which are focused 
on implementation and testing of model designs.  These grants are available for up to $100 
million; Maine was awarded a model test grant in 2013 for $33 million.  At this point, we are 
not aware of any specific announcements by CMS to make available additional rounds of SIM 
grants, but the statutory funding authority of the Center for Medicare Innovations runs 
through 2019.76  The State should investigate availability and timing of future funding rounds 
and plan payment reform activities with available funding in mind.  Among the potential uses 
of these resources would be to fund staffing of the Commissions recommended in this report, 
funding the development of the expanded data transparency initiatives described below, as 
well as expanding the ACO technical support and infrastructure requests contained in the 
most recent SIM application request. 
 
3. Establish a Commission 
The state could enact legislation establishing a multi-stakeholder commission and charge it 
with recommending legislation to contain health care costs, improve health care quality and 
ensure access to care in New Hampshire.  There is already broad stakeholder support for the 
state, and NHID, to play a convening role in developing new payment models, and more 
broadly formulating a vision for health care delivery, improving quality and achieving cost 
containment in the state.  These were some of the primary findings in the previous UMass 
report on stakeholder concerns and recommendations. 77  
 
The commission could include representatives from major stakeholders in the health care 
system, such as hospitals, clinicians, payers, employers, and consumers.  These members 
could be appointed by the Governor, or several different elected officials could each appoint 
one or more members.  The commission could also include representatives of government 
agencies such as NHID, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of the 
Attorney General, and other relevant agencies.  The charge for a short-term commission 
                                                 
75 For the Round 2 application, see New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, “State Innovation 
Model (SIM) Model Design Application,” July 21, 2014, http://www.dhhs.nh.gov/ocom/documents/sim-round2-
app-sub.pdf (accessed October 8, 2014).  
76 Section 1115A of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §1315a. 
77 University of Massachusetts Medical School, “Analysis of Price Variations in New Hampshire Hospitals,” April 
2012, http://www.nh.gov/insurance/lah/documents/umms.pdf (accessed October 6, 2014). 
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would be to report on cost containment issues facing the state, and potential mechanisms for 
controlling costs, such as a transition to alternative payment methods and integrated care.  
 
The special commission should be given funding for staffing to be provided either by 
designated state employees or by consultants.  The legislation could require the commission to 
consider specific options and to conduct analysis to project the likely outcomes of each 
option.  The commission should be required to meet regularly (with a minimum set number of 
times established in the legislation), and those meetings would be open to the public.  The 
commission could be charged with issuing a final report and recommended legislation by a 
date certain, perhaps eighteen months from the date the law is enacted. 
 
4. Expand Consumer Protections  
As the state transitions to new models of care and payment, it should consider enacting 
legislation to ensure adequate consumer protections.  Where ACOs, integrated and 
coordinated care models, and alternative payment methods are designed to improve care 
delivery efficiency and quality and contain costs, they may potentially result in unintended 
consequences of reducing appropriate care utilization as well as “cherry-picking” healthier 
patients.  
 
The suggested consumer protection tools are useful for monitoring consumer care in all health 
care systems, and are especially helpful in a transition to new models of care and payment. 
Since New Hampshire already has some ACOs, the state should consider implementing 
consumer reforms for the current system in the short-term, as well as incorporating these 
reforms with any of the longer term options.  
 
We recommend that New Hampshire consider adding some or all of the following consumer 
protections: 
a. Quality measurement by providers, ACOs, and other health care entities; 
b. Robust grievance and appeals processes;78  
c. Monitoring for under-utilization; 
d. Provisions for obtaining second opinions; 
e. Stratifying quality measures by race, disability, ethnicity, language, etc.; 
f.  Ombudsman program with data collection monitoring types of complaints; 
g. Patient advisory councils; and 
h. Audit requirements.79  
                                                 
78 This could include provisions regarding what constitutes an “appealable” service decision, internal appeal 
processes for ACOs and risk-bearing organizations, and adequate external appeals to a state agency.  
79 See 42 CFR 425.316(b) for Medicare Shared Savings Program approach 
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All of the approaches described in this report have a better chance of resulting in higher 
quality and better outcomes for consumers if appropriate consumer protections are included as 
part of the reforms. 
 
 
C.  Stand-Alone Actions 
 
We identified two additional actions New Hampshire could take to contain certain costs without 
pursuing comprehensive reform.  New Hampshire could pursue either of these actions 
independently of our other recommendations. 
 
1. Reform Certificate of Need  
Certificate of Need (CON) programs are generally designed to contain health care facility 
expenses, and facilitate coordinated planning of new services and construction.  The laws and 
regulations that authorize CON programs and procedures are one method states use to reduce 
overall health-related and medical expenditures. 80  Under payment reform initiatives, 
especially global payments, providers have different incentives to invest in expensive clinical 
technologies which often trigger the CON process.  These become cost centers and may only 
be helpful to profits to the providers under a global budget if they attract new members.  
Onerous requirements for determining need for additional clinical facilities may be 
unnecessary if global payment replaces fee-for-service as the norm.  Additionally, there is 
already considerable stakeholder consensus in New Hampshire that the state’s CON processes 
are not effective and should be changed.81 
Many states continue to have CON programs, as part of their health resource planning 
procedures. 82  New Hampshire currently has CON regulations in effect.83  The state should 
consider reforming its CON process, as part of a short-term approach to payment reform.84  It 
could change its CON process to expedite review for certain categories of projects that further 
the states’ health reform goals, consolidate the criteria for review, and modify the thresholds 
                                                 
80 For additional background on origin and evolution of Certificate of Need laws nationwide, see National 
Conference of State Legislatures, “Certificate of Need:  State Health Laws and Programs,”  
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx   (accessed October 8, 2014).  
81University of Massachusetts Medical School and Freedman Healthcare, “New Hampshire’s Health Insurance 
Market and Provider Payment System: An Analysis of Stakeholder Views,” June 2013, 
http://www.nh.gov/insurance/reports/documents/nh_himkt_provpay_sys.pdf (accessed October 6, 2014) at 7. 
82 Ibid. 
83 N.H. Stat. Chapter 151-C; N.H. Code R. He-Hea.  
84 Earlier this year, New Hampshire revised some of the statutory thresholds triggering the CON process. See New 
Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, “Health Services Planning and Review,” 
http://www.dhhs.nh.gov/DPHS/hspr/index.htm. The state has previously considered a bill to eliminate the CON 
process, which did not succeed (2012).  See Jaimy Lee, “Bill to Repeal CON Law Clears N.H. House,” March 14, 
2012, http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20120314/NEWS/303149944 (accessed October 8, 2014).  Other 
states  (including Maine) have sought to eliminate the CON process.  Massachusetts modified and amplified its 
process (new agencies involved; major modifications to nature of entity/process).    
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regarding the criteria for projects that would trigger the CON review process.  The state could 
also consider new requirements for CON applicants to submit an independent cost analysis.  
Current CON law in New Hampshire still requires a lengthy process for a wide variety of 
capital improvements to a broad set of provider types.  The process establishes a detailed 
CON standard setting process, and application process, that must be coordinated.  
Additionally, the timeframe for the review process of CON applications is 180 days (six 
months) from commencement of the review process; there is a 60 day general notification 
process before the review process can commence, as well.85  There is currently a rather long 
review process by the state for expansions/improvements with relatively low thresholds (even 
under the March 2014 updated standards).  
The impact of an improved CON process on state costs could be beneficial, if the state eases 
and expedites the process for projects that further the goals of health reform initiatives, 
including, for example, maintaining adequate access in Northern New Hampshire.  Note that 
as competition and/or merger activity increases, the focus on the adequacy and fairness of the 
state’s CON process is likely to increase substantially as well. 
 
2.  Reform Nonprofit Requirements  
The New Hampshire Department of Justice’s Charitable Trust Unit monitors the provision of 
community benefits by health care charitable trusts and executive pay at New Hampshire 
nonprofit hospitals.86  These powers could be used to promote payment reform in a number of 
ways, as follows:  
a)  Community Benefits.  In order to claim certain federal and state tax exemptions as 
nonprofit entities, hospitals must show that they provide “community benefits.”  The 
federal Internal Revenue Service oversees this process for federal tax exemptions, and the 
New Hampshire Department of Justice oversees this process for New Hampshire tax 
exemptions.87  In New Hampshire, community benefits are generally seen in the form of 
patient financial assistance (“charity care”), public health programs, support for 
community health needs, and research. 88  Some analysts have found that the federal and 
state community benefits requirements are not as robust as they could be.89   
New Hampshire requires nonprofit hospitals whose fund balances exceed $100,000 to 
submit community benefits reports.90  The New Hampshire Certificate of Need process 
also requires community benefits (see discussion of CON process, above).   
                                                 
85 See RSA Title XI c. 151-c1-8. 
86 New Hampshire Department of Justice, “Community Benefits,” http://www.doj.nh.gov/charitable-
trusts/community-benefits/index.htm (accessed October 8, 2014). 
87 N.H. Stat. Chapter 7 §7:32-c et. seq.; 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) 
88 N.H. Stat. Chapter 7 §7:32-d (definition of community benefits). 
89 See Health Affairs blog, “Hospital Community Benefit Expenditures:  Looking Behind the Numbers,” 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/06/11/hospital-community-benefit-expenditures-looking-behind-the-numbers/ 
(accessed October 22, 2014).  
90 N.H. Stat. Chapter 7:32-c et. seq.  
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The ACA has some implications for hospital community benefits.  First, Section 9007 
directly amends the federal community benefits process, requiring hospitals to conduct a 
community health needs assessment, develop a written financial assistance policy, and 
limit certain hospital charges and collection policies.91   
Second, the ACA presents a couple of competing factors that will influence how much 
hospitals pay for charity care.  On one hand, as more New Hampshire residents obtain 
health care through health exchanges or Medicaid under the ACA, the demand for charity 
care may diminish.92  On the other hand, ACA reductions of Disproportionate Share 
Hospital payments to hospitals could offset these cost savings.93   
We recommend that New Hampshire evaluate the impact of the ACA’s insurance 
expansion and Disproportionate Share Payment provisions on New Hampshire hospitals’ 
financial contributions to charity care.  If New Hampshire hospitals receive a windfall as 
a result of ACA insurance expansion, we recommend that New Hampshire consider 
expanding its community benefits requirements.  For example, New Hampshire could 
encourage or require nonprofit hospitals to invest more funds into public health or 
community health programs, such as care coordination, health education, and health 
promotion, and to demonstrate how these programs improve population health and 
contain costs.94  New Hampshire could also increase the number of patients eligible for 
subsidized care by expanding income limits.95     
b) Executive Pay.  The New Hampshire Department of Justice collects reports of 
executive pay at nonprofit hospitals.  In a recent report commissioned by the Department 
of Justice, the New Hampshire Center for Public Policy Studies found that executive pay 
generally met IRS standards for nonprofit status, and that Executive pay was roughly in 
line with New England hospital executive pay (though higher than other northern New 
England states).96  
As payment reform progresses, we recommend that New Hampshire continue to monitor 
executive pay levels.   The state should consider requiring that nonprofits report the 5 or 
10 highest paid employees to the New Hampshire Department of Justice.  Additionally, 
the Department of Justice could provide information to non-profit boards regarding 
                                                 
91 Affordable Care Act § 9007 
92 See United States Department of Health and Human Services, “Impact of Insurance Expansion on Hospital 
Uncompensated Care in 2014,” September 24, 2014, 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2014/UncompensatedCare/ib_UncompensatedCare.pdf (accessed October 8, 
2014). 
93 Ibid. 
94 See Chris Kabel, “What is the Future of Hospital Community Benefits Programs?” Stanford Social Innovation 
Review, June 5, 2013.   
95 According to New Hampshire regulations, hospitals required to show community benefit must have in place a 
financial assistance policy that provides free care to any individuals whose household income is under 150% of the 
Federal Poverty Level.  N.H. Code Admin. R. He-Hea 303.04(d).  New Hampshire could increase that minimum 
income threshold, perhaps with a sliding fee scale above 150% of the Federal Poverty Level.  
96 New Hampshire Center for Public Policy, “Executive Compensation at New Hampshire Non-Profit Hospitals,” 
June 2012, http://doj.nh.gov/charitable-trusts/documents/20120702-nh-public-policy-report.pdf (accessed October 8, 
2014).  
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regional norms for executive pay.  To the extent the Department of Justice finds a 
nonprofit’s salaries exceeds regional norms for health care organizations of similar size, 
the Department could consider several consequences.  The Department could begin by 
informing the board that executive pay is excessive and asking it to make adjustments to 
bring salaries into line.  Next, the Department could issue a public notice stating that the 
executive pay is excessive.  As a last resort, the Department could replace the board on 
the grounds that it failed to do its fiduciary duty.   
 
V. Conclusion  
 
A wide variety of new health care payment and system delivery approaches exist which can help 
states contain costs.  New Hampshire should build on existing initiatives in this area, by 
considering both short-term and longer term reforms.  Payers and providers have acknowledged 
the need for cost containment and new approaches, and the state can build additional stakeholder 
support by creating a commission, both for short-term and long-term reforms.  In the short-term, 
the state should focus on steps that increase transparency and pricing fairness, establishing a 
commission, regulate provider risk bearing, enact targeted nonprofit law reforms, and enact 
antitrust reform through the state action immunity doctrine.  In the longer term, New Hampshire 
should consider: increasing transparency requirements and establishing statewide cost 
benchmarks; promulgating a Model Contract which incorporates alternative payment methods 
and requiring its use or the use of a similar contract model designed by stakeholders, and using 
the threat of rate regulation to incentivize stakeholder consensus; and establishing an employer 
purchasing collaborative.  Using these approaches, either together or separately, New Hampshire 
can initiate and implement changes to promote effective cost containment while preserving 
access and quality. 
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Appendix A:  Wide-Net Options 
 
In order to develop a set of recommendations for NHID to consider in developing a strategy to 
contain health care costs in the state, Compass and UMass surveyed the variety of strategies 
undertaken or considered by other states to identify the full range of options, including 
regulatory, payment and service delivery reform, and employer- and individual-focused 
approaches.   
i. Regulatory Options 
a. All Payer Rate Setting 
In all payer rate setting, the state sets rates that must be used by all payers.  While many 
states regulated rates in the 1970’s, today only Maryland sets all-payer rates, and only 
for hospital services.  West Virginia sets hospital rates for Medicaid and commercial 
payers. Vermont’s Green Mountain Care Board is mandated under that state’s law to 
establish all-payer rates for all services, but it has not yet fulfilled that mandate.97  In 
these states, regardless of the insurance a person has, or if they are uninsured, the same 
rate is charged. Under this model, the state has used this authority to keep rate increases 
low.  
b. Cost Growth Benchmarks 
Cost growth benchmarks are budget targets set at either the state or provider level, or 
both, which establish a benchmark for an appropriate rate of growth of health care 
costs.  Both Massachusetts and Maryland are in the process of implementing cost 
growth targets. Massachusetts establishes an overall target for health care expenditures 
and rate of growth for entire health care sector.  If overall state health care expenditures 
exceed the statewide target, then individual providers who exceed growth benchmarks 
are identified in public reporting and must explain their cost increases.  The state also 
has authority to levy fines for providers who do not meet benchmarks (to take effect 
next year).98 
c. Publicly Financed Single Payer Plan 
A single payer system is one that combines Medicaid, Medicare and commercial plans. 
Vermont is developing a single payer plan that will be publicly financed, regulated by 
the state and overseen by the Green Mountain Care Board.99  The anticipated effect is 
that a single payer will be able to achieve savings though lowering the administrative 
cost associated with multiple health insurers and keep overall health costs down.  The 
private insurance market in Vermont will be limited to self-funded employer plans not 
subject to state law, and insurance for supplemental benefits. 
 
                                                 
9718 V.S.A. §9376. 
98 M.G.L. c. 6D section 9. 
99 Chapter 48 of the Vermont Acts of 2011. 
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d. Regulation of Provider Risk  
Regulation of provider risk bearing is a tool that is often mentioned in discussions of 
new payment and system delivery reform models.100  As groups of providers come 
together to undertake more coordinated, integrated and cost effective care, regulation is 
needed to ensure that when providers take on performance risk – financial risk for 
performing on quality measures, and sharing in any savings or losses with other 
providers – they do not assume excess risk.101  
e. Regulation of the Basis of Payment  
States may develop regulation that requires all payers to use the same basis of payment, 
such as a diagnosis-related group (DRG) methodology for hospital stays.  Maryland 
sets rates and mandates the use of the DRG methodology.  However, it is possible for 
states to mandate one payment method, such as DRGs, even if they do not establish the 
rates themselves.  This could reduce the administrative burden on providers, and make 
prices across payers more comparable. 
f. Regulatory/Administrative Simplification  
One source of the administrative costs of health care is the many differing procedures 
for authorizations, billing and reporting that are required by differing payers and 
government agencies.  The state could work with providers and payers to develop 
unified procedures and data collection, and then require unified procedures and data 
collection from all payers and agencies.  
g. Certificate of Need  
The Certificate of Need (CON) process is a state regulatory program intended to 
determine the appropriateness of new or expanded health care services and facilities.  In 
New Hampshire, providers are required to obtain a CON to construct facilities, 
purchase certain medical equipment and to add inpatient bed capacity.  Many providers 
consider the process cumbersome and there may be interest in either reforming or 
abolishing the program.  A reformed CON could streamline the process and result in 
more targeted decisions on the expansion of health care capacity. 
h. Nonprofit Law Reforms  
A number of reforms to the laws governing not for profit organizations could impact 
health care costs.  For example, the state could take a more active approach in 
overseeing mergers of nonprofit health care entities, to keep some competition in the 
health care market. The state could require health care entities to provide certain 
additional community benefits when they have excess profit margins as compared to 
the statewide average. The state could more closely monitor executive pay at nonprofit 
health care providers and impose consequences for organizations where the executive 
pay exceeds a benchmark tied to the statewide average for such costs, such as 
                                                 
100 See, e.g., Commonwealth of Massachusetts, “Recommendations of the Special Commission on Payment 
Reform,” July 2009, http://www.mass.gov/chia/gov/commissions-and-initiatives/health-care-payment-
system/recommendations-of-the-special-commission-on.html  
101 See Manatt report at 8-22 for discussion of legal issues in connection with regulation of provider risk. 
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reviewing an organizations status or imposing additional community benefit payment 
requirements.  
i. Anti-Trust Law Reforms 
The transition to formation of ACOs and other integrated care entities can raise both 
federal and state antitrust issues, if it results in increased consolidation and prices.  The 
state can take steps to protect against antitrust violations by enacting legislation 
establishing the state action immunity doctrine in connection with specific ACO and 
payment reform related initiatives.  The theory of state action immunity is as follows: 
when a state establishes a program that encourages activity that might otherwise be 
viewed as anticompetitive, the participants in the program may be able to receive 
immunity from federal antitrust rules.  
 
ii. Payment and Service Delivery Reform Options 
a. ACOs/Integrated Care Organizations  
The state could develop policies, regulations and contracts that encourage the 
development of ACOs and other integrated care organizations, defined as groups of 
health care providers that agree to be collectively accountable for the cost, quality and 
overall care of an entire population.102  
b. Alternative Payment Methods  
The state could develop policies and model contracts that encourage the use of new 
payment methods that are alternatives to traditional fee-for-service reimbursements. 
Alternative payment methods could include a range of approaches, including global 
payments, bundled payments and shared savings for performance on quality measures.  
The state could develop such payment methods within the Medicaid program, and 
encourage similar payment strategies among private payers. 
c. Patient Centered Medical Homes  
Patient centered medical homes are primary care practices that include enhanced care 
coordination and integration of medical and behavioral health.  Patient centered 
medical homes are typically paid a per member per month payment to coordinate care 
and track and monitor the health of their patients on a systematic basis.  The state could 
develop policies and contracts that encourage the further development of patient 
centered medical homes at the primary care level.  
 
                                                 
102 American Health Lawyers Association, “ACOs and Population Health: What is on the Horizon?” Webinar, 
September 19, 2014. 
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d. Public-Payer Approaches  
Since the state has more authority over the services it pays for directly, it could develop 
strategies such as ACO contracts, bundled rates or patient centered medical homes 
within the New Hampshire Medicaid program.  By implementing new payment reform 
approaches and programs within government programs, the state can lead the way in 
cost containment with fewer administrative and legal hurdles than it faces in 
implementing system wide or statewide changes.  However, since only 8% of the New 
Hampshire population is served by Medicaid, the impact of a change in the Medicaid 
program alone may be considerably less robust and may increase the administrative 
complexity of the overall health care system and potentially increase costs in the 
commercial market. 
 
iii. Employer and Individual Approaches 
Employer and individual approaches build upon the natural incentive for both 
employers and individuals to work towards lower health care costs.  Large employers 
particularly may develop innovative approaches to keeping their costs low and their 
employees healthy and productive.  While the state may not be able to require the 
adoption of these approaches, the state may want to ensure that there are not regulatory 
barriers to successful approaches that employers develop.103 
a. Employer Purchasing Collaborative 
The State could establish a collaborative of employers, obtain funding to staff the 
collaborative and give employers tools and clout and charge to negotiate reforms.  The 
collaborative could be focused on commercial small employer groups, or could be 
expanded to include larger employers and even the Medicaid managed care program. 
b. Employer Direct Contracting with Providers/ACOs for Provision of Care  
Some employers have contracted directly with health care systems to provide for 
provision of care.  Large employers may have clinics at the work-site.  These direct 
contracting and service arrangements are often provided in addition to providing health 
insurance, and provide ease of access to care for employees.  
c. Promote Consumer Value-Based Purchasing through Price Transparency  
New Hampshire has the well-developed public HealthCost website that provides 
consumers with information about the cost of care to help them manage their costs and 
choose value-based purchasing options for care. This website and requirements for its 
contents could be expanded to include quality measures and more detailed information 
on both provider prices and insurance premium levels to help consumers make 
informed decisions. 
                                                 
103 See Manatt report at 7, 12-19 for discussion of legal issues in connection with employer approaches. 
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d. Promote Consumer Value-Based Purchasing through Price Transparency and 
Individual Health Care Savings Accounts  
As more employers and the individual insurance market offer higher deductible plans, 
individual health accounts become important tools to help consumers afford care when 
needed.  Individual health care savings accounts (HSAs) allow consumers to save for 
their out of pocket medical costs in designated tax free accounts.  HSAs, when 
combined with price and quality transparency, provide incentives for consumers to 
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Appendix B: Legal Hurdles to Wide-Net Options 
Legal Hurdles:104 
We analyzed the legal steps, hurdles and risks that may be raised by each of the payment 
reform options evaluated for this project, set forth below.  
Regulatory  
a.   All Payer Rate Setting (Maryland)-Legal Hurdles: Medium/High (if Medicare is 
included; Medium if not)105 
All payer rate setting raises relatively few direct legal risks. It raises the following 
hurdles: The state106 would have to amend its insurance laws, and issue broad legislation 
allowing the state to set rates across the board for hospital (and potentially other) 
services, such as is done in Maryland. The state would need to amend its 1115 Medicaid 
waiver application documents (or submit a new waiver application, depending on the 
status of its recent application), and would need to amend its State Plan as well. 107 
Additionally, the state would need to apply to CMS for a Medicare waiver (similar to that 
in Maryland). Obtaining a Medicare waiver could be complex and time-consuming. This 
approach could be combined with global or alternative payment methods/global budget 
targets and/or ACO initiatives. 
The indirect legal risks include the following: The state could face challenges (including 
litigation) from providers objecting to the rates, if they are not adequate either as is or in 
connection with other health reform initiatives the state may seek to implement 
contemporaneously.  
The legislation would also need to identify or create the government entity charged with 
setting and reviewing these rates, which would likely be controversial. 
b.   “Cost Growth Benchmarks”-Target Growth Rate for Total Medical Expenditures- 
Legal Hurdles: Medium 
For the state to establish global budget targets, it would need to establish targets by which 
to measure spending (such as the “potential gross state product” in MA, set forth as a 
measure in chapter 224).  
The state would need to obtain funding and establish governmental infrastructure, 
through legislation, to evaluate the targets, and oversee each provider’s expenditures as 
                                                 
104 The information in this report is intended as a framework for policy strategy, and is not intended as legal advice. 
The NHID would need to consult with attorneys licensed to practice law in New Hampshire for legal advice on any 
specific state law issues.  
105 Designation of high, medium, or low has been made to indicate an estimate of the relative degree of legal 
hurdles, with “high” being the highest. 
106 All references to “the state” refer to the state of New Hampshire. 
107 See Section II.A. infra. for discussion of Medicaid.  
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measured against the targets. Additionally, it would need to determine when and whether 
providers would be subject to any penalties or other action (such as performance 
improvement plan requirements in chapter 224 in MA). The state could require a state 
agency to take on this responsibility, after consulting with interested parties. Another 
option is to establish a Commission comprised of impartial members with specific 
expertise to establish the benchmarks. The legislature could have ongoing involvement 
with the new agency, to review and provide input on new targets, at least annually.  
c.   Single Payer (Vermont)-Legal Hurdles: High 
Single payer raises the following hurdles: The state would need broad legislation 
authorizing single payer, and would need to establish whether an existing government 
entity would run it (such as NHID) or a new one (such as was established in VT). The 
state would need to request approval from CMS to use federal funds for such a program, 
for both Medicaid and Medicare. More specifically, the state would need a waiver from 
the provisions of Section 1332 of the ACA. Additional governmental infrastructure may 
be needed (and established through legislation) to implement single payer statewide.  
The legal risks include challenges by carriers as their role will effectively be 
marginalized or eliminated, ultimately. The state could face other challenges depending 
on the way it decides to fund a single payer initiative.  
d.   Regulation of Provider Risk-Legal Hurdles: Low/Medium 
Regulation of provider risk is an avenue that the state could seriously consider.  Please 
see p. 15 of Manatt report for detailed reasons that regulation of provider risk may be 
desirable/advisable, and risks of failing to do so (provider solvency, lack of capacity to 
absorb risk, insurer solvency, consumer access). Regulating provider risk also aligns with 
federal interest in limiting provider risk, even where insurer maintains full financial 
responsibility (and note specifically alignment with Medicare Shared Savings Program, 
Pioneer ACO, as well as Medicare Advantage program requirements).  
The state may pursue provider risk regulation in several ways:  
i. The NHID could amend its regulations to include additional requirements for carrier 
contracts with providers that take on significant downside risk  
ii. The state could enact legislation directing NHID to evaluate whether and how to 
regulate downside risk in carrier contracts with providers (including ACOs) taking 
on significant downside risk. Options could include process (review, risk 
certificate) as well as substance (rules re: stop loss insurance, performance bonds, 
etc.).  
iii. If the state wants to include all provider/provider organizations in these requirements 
(not just those entering into commercial carrier contracts, but Medicaid and other 
public payers as well), in addition to bullet two above, it would need to include in 
legislation provisions applicable to all providers taking on downside risk (e.g. 
require that they obtain risk certificates and meet any other requirements related to 
provider risk). 
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iv. Alternatively, the state could issue legislation indicating that the respective public 
payers will separately determine risk rules for their specific programs). This is a 
less broad based approach, and risks having different rules for the same provider 
/provider organization.  
e.   Regulation of Basis of Payment (e.g. Must Pay Using DRGs)-Legal Hurdles: 
Low/Medium 
This model envisions the state establishing the payment structure, but carriers and 
providers would still negotiate the level of payments for their contracts as they do 
currently. Note that there is currently an amendment proposed in New Hampshire to 
require use of DRG payments for reimbursement of hospitals. See: proposed Amendment 
RSA 420-J adding a new section 8-e as follows: 420-J: 8-e Common Hospital Payment 
Methodology Required. There are significantly fewer hurdles/risks inherent in this 
category than in GP’s/ACOs. Since Medicare and New Hampshire Medicaid already uses 
DRGs (uses Medicare DRGs as basis), this approach has the advantage of 
administrative/regulatory simplification (see below) as well as a less radical “glide path” 
for state to transition to new payment methods. This would also promote transparency of 
pricing. 
A multi-payer approach to using DRGs (rather than, e.g., per diem or percentage of 
charge methodologies), for example, would call for amendments to the state’s insurance 
laws, to permit NHID to require all carriers to use DRGs, and potentially specify a 
uniform way the DRG would be used, and may also require specification of the method 
and responsibility for estimating DRG cost weights for the commercial population 
Additionally, the state would likely need to amend its state plan, to clarify that providers 
would be reimbursed in accordance with this new payment method. 
 The state may need to submit a waiver, or amend its current waiver request, though 
where this is not changing provider type or the types of services that Medicaid 
traditionally pays for (and in any event, is already used by the state Medicaid agency) a 
waiver may not be needed. The state would need a Medicare waiver if Medicare is to be 
included in this approach.  
The state may face a risk of challenges from certain categories of providers if this new 
methodology is viewed is inadequate or inappropriate for them. Critical Access Hospitals 
(CAHs) and rural providers may argue that a specific payment structure doesn’t work for 
them and they should be reimbursed based on costs (or costs +). For example, Medicare 
and Medicaid do not use DRGs for CAHs — they are paid 101% of reasonable costs. 
CAHs could be exempted from this requirement. 
f.   Regulatory Simplification108-Legal Hurdles: Low/Medium 
Options for regulatory simplification that would likely result in savings include the 
following: 
                                                 
108 Some examples are included in this category. 
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i. Standardization of: 
•  provider credentialing,  
•  prior authorizations,  
•  formularies, and  
•  claims submission process  
ii. Conducting an inventory of data required by state agencies and reducing duplicate 
requests (common request of providers).  
iii. Also see CON reform discussion below. 
These reforms would likely call for legislation, and regulatory changes to 
insurance laws (e.g. for changes to claims submission form/process). If Medicaid 
is to be included, state Medicaid regulations would need to be revised. Waiver 
and SPA would need to be analyzed to determine if changes are needed-may not 
need modifications if not changing system delivery mechanism, reimbursement, 
or members to be served. 
g.   Certificate of Need Reform-Legal Hurdles: Low/Medium 
See Section IV.C. 1 of this report.  
h.   Nonprofit Law Reforms Through the New Hampshire Department of Justice- Legal 
Hurdles: Low-Medium 
See Section IV.C.2 of this report.  
Promotion of New Payment and Delivery Models  
a.  ACOs/ Integrated Care Organizations-Legal Hurdles: Medium 
  See Section IV.A.2 of this report. 
b.  Global Payments- Legal Hurdles: Medium  
  See discussion at Section IV.A.2 of this report. 
 c.  Patient Centered Medical Homes (PCMH)- Legal Hurdles: Medium 
New Hampshire already appears to have a multi-payer PCMH initiative that has been 
underway since at least 2009. See: http://citizenshealthinitiative.org/medical-home-
project.  
Depending on how they are structured/promoted by the state, PCMH programs can raise 
some of the same legal issues as ACOs, though generally to a lesser degree. 
d.  Public-Payer Specific Approaches— Legal Hurdles: Medium 
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The state could promote payment reform through public payer specific approaches, which 
could include programs through the Medicaid agency such as: 
i. Alternative payment pilot for integrated provider, for providing additional 
nontraditional services for a chronic illness 
ii. A new payment method for paying an existing category of providers (e.g. primary 
care providers) to coordinate primary care and behavioral health services 
iii. Establish a Medicaid ACO program with a new category of provider or entity (could 
be through managed care entity, alternatively) to coordinate wider range of services 
for members 
The legal hurdles for these include amending the state’s Medicaid waiver (and possibly 
state plan as well). It may include amending the state’s Medicaid regulations. Finally, a 
Medicaid ACO program would raise the ACO related legal issues indicated above. Note 
that the second bullet may raise ACO legal issues as well, depending on program design.  
An additional legal obstacle includes the shift to managed care, and relationship to any 
provider based Medicaid reform. New Hampshire recently moved most of its Medicaid 
population to managed care (called “Care Management”). So it would add some 
complexity to try to implement a public payer approach with new provider based models 
in Medicaid, since the MCOs now establish provider rates through their contracts, not 
Medicaid. The state would need to negotiate new terms with its MCOs, which could 
prove challenging. Alternatively, the state could work with its MCOs to align on 
initiatives that the MCOs are interested in implementing on the payment reform front-
though these may be much more modest than those the state would seek to launch with 
Medicaid providers directly.  
Employer and Individual Approaches 
a.  Employer Purchasing Collaborative 
 
  See Section IV.A.3 of this report. 
b.  Employer Direct Contracting with Providers/ACOs for Provision of Care - Legal  
Hurdles: High  
As insurance costs become more expensive, New Hampshire employers may consider 
contracting directly with providers or ACOs. New Hampshire might consider encouraging 
these relationships, but there are a number of legal issues and questions to consider before 
proceeding:  
    i.  Would this fulfill the employer mandate in the ACA? Or would employers also have  
     to buy insurance for their employees? 
ii.  Added risk to members – directly contracting with ACOs in essence creates an 
extremely narrow network. What provisions would be available to protect employees 
who need specialized care not offered at the ACO, or care that is provided while the 
employee was out-of-state?  
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iii.  Added risk to employers – Employers who self-fund their insurance sometimes 
subject themselves to more legal risks. See 
http://www.nh.gov/insurance/consumers/health.htm 
iv. Added risk to providers – Providers who directly contract with employers may have 
to take on more insurance risk.  
v. Less control by the state. These arrangements may be deemed “self-insured plans” 
and not subject to state insurance law (and instead governed by ERISA). For 
example, state insurance law regarding mandated benefits may not cover these 
arrangements. The state may not be able to legislate standards for direct contracting 
with self-insured plans, and may only be able to encourage participation by such 
plans in new payment reform initiatives, but not mandate it (so, it would just be 
voluntary). 
vi. Employers may not be well equipped to monitor for quality and under-utilization.  
c.  Promote Consumer Value-Based Purchasing Through Price Transparency and 
Individual Health Accounts— Legal Hurdles: Medium/High  
New Hampshire might consider promoting a model where consumers take on more risk 
for their health care costs, with high deductible plans. A number of issues could be 
considered under this option:  
i.  The ACA requires insurance plans to devote a certain percentage of premiums to 
services, rather than administration. An important question is whether these health 
accounts meet the medical loss ratio requirements in the ACA. See 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/hsas-health-savings-accounts.aspx 
ii.  Under the ACA, large employers are responsible for offering insurance coverage 
that meets a certain standard of comprehensive coverage. Certain individuals are also 
responsible for becoming insured. One key issue is whether these health accounts meet 
the individual and employer mandates in the ACA.  
iii.  If these accounts are in the Exchange, the state may end up paying more for 
wraparound coverage for Medicaid expansion adults.  
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Appendix C: Legal, Administrative and Cost Considerations for 
Strategy 2 
 
Legal Considerations: There Are a Number of Steps the State Would Need to Take to 
Implement Option 2.  
 
(1) Establishing Multi Stakeholder Commission: The state would need to enact 
legislation establishing the multi-stakeholder commission, and its charge and timeframe.  It 
would need to either contain the terms for the Model Contract, or specify when the Model 
Contract would be issued (prior to the commencement of the commission meetings).  The 
legislation would need to make clear that if the stakeholders did not agree to the Model 
Contract, or come up with the components for a similar agreement, that would need to be 
approved by a designated state agency (NHID), the state would start regulating rates across 
the board. 
(2) Medicaid and Medicare Participation: For the state to achieve the largest cost 
containment, it would need to have both Medicaid and Medicare participation in using the 
Model Contract, and/or its components, such as use of global payments and alternative 
payment methods.  This would require that the state seek and obtain a Medicaid waiver from 
CMS.  The waiver may include a request for providers/ACOs to be able to utilize alternative 
payments for a wide variety of services, including some not traditionally covered by 
Medicaid or thought of as a health care service (for example, using a global payment to pay 
for air conditioners for asthma patients, and thereby reduce hospital utilization).  Once 
obtained, the state Medicaid agency would need to adopt the Model Contract and use it in 
contracting with its providers, as well.  The state would also need to submit a Medicare 
waiver, for Medicare participation.  
 
Note that the legislation could direct the state to seek these waivers; it could also exempt 
ACOs already participating in the Pioneer or MSSP programs from using the Model Contract 
(Pioneer and MSSP contracts contain the above-described features, already). 
(3) Commercial Carrier Issues: Amendments may be needed to the statutory provisions 
of RSA 415 and RSA 420, to align with the new legislative provisions authorizing the Model 
Contract use by carriers and establishing threshold criteria for use of the Model Contract by 
providers. 
(4)  ACO Formation and Global Payment Hurdles: Finally, there are a number of legal 
hurdles associated with ACO formation and global and alternative payments, raised by 
federal and state fraud and abuse laws, and antitrust laws.  These are potentially raised by the 
state requiring the adoption of a Model Contract or similar agreement, which promotes 
gainsharing among providers, and new care referral relationships.  While these are complex 
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issues, there are potential approaches and solutions that the state can explore as it establishes 
the commission.109 Additionally, the state could adopt legislation establishing the state action 
immunity doctrine, to protect providers participating in state health reform initiatives from 
the threat of federal antitrust law prosecution (see Section IV.A.2.f of this report for further 
discussion).  
(5)  All Payer Rate Setting: In the longer term, if the commission failed to adopt either the 
Model Contract or a similar agreement, the state would need to enact additional legislation to 
mandate all payer rate setting.  Rate regulation raises relatively few direct legal risks, but 
involves the following: The state would have to amend its insurance laws, and issue broad 
legislation allowing the state to set rates across the board for hospital (and potentially other) 
services, such as is done in Maryland.  The state would need to amend its 1115 Medicaid 
waiver application documents (or submit a new waiver application, depending on the status 
of its recent application), and would need to amend its State Plan as well.  Additionally, the 
state would need to apply to CMS for a Medicare waiver (similar to that in Maryland).  This 
approach could be combined with global or alternative payment methods/global budget 
targets and/or ACO initiatives. 
The indirect legal risks include the following: The state could face challenges (including 
litigation) from providers objecting to the rates, if they are not adequate either as is or in 
connection with other health reform initiatives the state may seek to implement 
contemporaneously.  
Additionally, the state would need to obtain authorization from CMS to include Medicare, 
and would need a Medicaid waiver and an amendment to the state plan currently in effect. 
The legislation would also need to identify or create the government entity charged with 
setting and reviewing these rates. 
(6) Voluntary Participation by Self Insured: The rates and contracts negotiated by self-
insured employers may not be within the jurisdiction of NHID or other state authorities, due 
to possible pre-emption by federal ERISA provisions.  Therefore, while their participation in 
the commission could be compelled, it is less clear whether their use of any Model Contract 
could be, and may need to be voluntary.110  Nonetheless, as the market shifts towards use of 
the Model Contract, employers may make that transition on their own-and may face pressure 
from providers and ACOs to do so, as well. 
(7) Regulation of Provider Risk: As contracting under Model Contract arrangements 
increase, and more ACOs and other integrated organizations seek to take on risk based 
contracting, the state should consider regulating provider risk.  This shift toward risk bearing 
contracts would need to be accompanied by contemporaneous regulation of provider risk, to 
protect provider solvency and minimize system and care delivery disruption and dysfunction. 
The state already has several ACOs and carrier-provider contracts utilizing alternative 
                                                 
109 See Manatt report at 22-24 for further discussion of, and potential solutions to, fraud and abuse issues, and 
Manatt report at 25-28 for discussion of antitrust issues and potential solutions. 
110 See Manatt report at 8-9 for further discussion of ERISA, potential New Hampshire regulatory authority over 
employer risk based contracting, and related solutions; see also p. 19 of Manatt report for discussion of difficulty 
predicting judicial rulings in the ERISA context. 
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payment methods, so it will be important to pair a shift toward new contract models with 
provider risk regulation.111  Regulating provider risk also aligns with the federal interest in 
limiting provider risk, even where the insurer maintains full financial responsibility (and 
specifically aligns with MSSP, Pioneer ACO, as well as Medicare Advantage program 
requirements).  See infra at Section IV.2.d) for additional discussion of provider risk.   
                                                 
111 See p. 15 of Manatt report for detailed reasons that this is desirable/advisable, and risks of failing to do so 
(provider solvency, lack of capacity to absorb risk, insurer solvency, consumer access). 
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